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NOTES 
A Banker's Adventures in Brokerland: Looking Through 
Glass-Steagall at Discount Brokerage Services 
Discount brokerage is a relatively new business, dating from the 
elimination of fixed brokerage commissions in 1975.1 Although dis-
count brokerage has no single definition, the business focuses on exe-
cuting customer-initiated orders.2 This concentration of function 
has two aspects. First, discount brokers generally do not employ a 
research staff or commissioned account executives,3 and so do not 
l. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) largely eliminated fixed brokerage 
commissions on May I, 1975, and Congress subsequently ratified this action. See SEC Securi-
ties Exchange Act Release No. 34-10383 [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 
79.511 (Sept. 11, 1973); Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, § 4(e)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(I) 
(1976). As a result of this move, many services are now priced separately, so that simple order 
execution may be offered at a relatively low price. See Branson, Securities Regulation Afler 
Entering the Competitive Era: 17ze Securities Industry, SEC Policy, and the Individual Investor, 
75 Nw. U. L. REv. 857, 891-92 (1980). 
Though new, discount brokers are making inroads into the business of traditional brokers. 
See Carrington, Discounters Are Taking Ever-Wider Slice of Broker Commissions, SIA Study 
Finds, Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1983, at 7, col. 1 (market share of discounters rose from 4.5% in 1979 
to 8.4% in 1982). 
2. See Wriggling through the loopholes, Banker, Jan. 1982 at 7 ("Discount brokers . . . offer 
cheap, no-frills stockbroking services, usually doing no more than executing a client's buy or 
sell order."). The Federal Reserve Board's notice requesting co=ent on BankAmerica's dis-
count brokerage application stated that the "business would be retail-oriented and would be 
characterized as 'discount brokerage.' •.. [BankAmerica] would give no investment advice, 
would not reco=end the purchase or sale of specific securities and would not offer to buy or 
sell specific securities." Application of Bank Holding Company lo Own a Securities Firm, (Cur-
rent] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) ~ 99,132, at 85,961 (Apr. 13, 1982) [hereinafter cited as 
BankAmerica Application]. 
In limiting their business to executing transactions in which they act as agents, discount 
brokers illustrate the typical distinction between brokers and dealers. "[A] 'broker' is a 'per• 
son' engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, 
whereas a dealer is a person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his 
own account." E. WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS 3 
(1965) (footnotes omitted). The Securities Act of 1933 defines "dealer" as "any person who 
engages either for all or part of his time, directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in 
the business of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by 
another person." 15 U.S.C. § 77b{l2) (1976). The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 all define broker 
and dealer separately. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4), 78c(a)(5); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(6), 80a-
2(a)(ll); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2(a)(3), 80b-2(a)(7) (1976). The main distinction under all three 
statutes is that a broker effects securities transactions for the account of others, while a dealer 
acts for his own account. 
3. See Shapiro, Shakeout in /he discount game, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1981, at 
146, 156; cf. Behind the Shakeout in discount brokering, FIN. WORLD Feb. 15, 1982, at 46, 47 
("But the idea behind discounting is to pare down overhead by offering no research or other 
retail services ..•. "). One discounter's operation is almost clerical in nature: a "customer is 
not assigned a personal representative but deals with any available representative, who in 
many cases enters the customer's order in an automated execution system, which can execute 
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offer any investment advice to customers.4 By acting only as agents 
in these transactions, discount brokers can charge much lower rates 
than traditional "full-service" brokers, as much as seventy percent 
lower in some cases.5 Second, discount brokers generally do not en-
gage in the underwriting, market making, and dealing for their own 
account typical of traditional securities firms. 6 A discount broker de-
rives its profit from a charge on transactions,7 not from the promo-
tion of an investment in particular securities. 
Several banks8 have recently entered or announced their inten-
the order in as short a time as thirty seconds." Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Order Approving Acquisition of Retail .Discount Brokerage Firm, 69 Fed. Reserve Bull. 
no. 2, 105, 106 (Feb. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Federal Reserve Board]. 
4. See Behind the Shakeout in discount brokering, supra note 3, at 47; Wriggling through the 
loopholes, supra note 2; BankAmerica Application, supra note 2. 
5. See Behind the Shakeout in discount brokering, supra note 3, at 47. 
6. Cf. BankAmerica Application, supra note 2, at 85,961 ("Applicant would not engage in 
dealing, market making, or underwriting."). 
For a description of the activities of more traditional "full-service" brokerage houses, see 
L. SHEPARD, THE SECURITIES BROKERAGE INDUSTRY 6-8 (1975) (dealing for their own ac-
count, underwriting, etc.). 
7. E.g., 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1215 (2d ed. 1961) (citing Securities and Ex-
change Commission Report on the function of brokers and dealers). A broker "has no benefi-
cial interest in the transaction except the commission or other remuneration which he receives 
for his services." Id. Though this definition referred to the type of brokerage income earned 
before the advent of discount brokerage, it remains an accurate description of discount broker-
age revenue. 
Just as the full-service "brokerage" houses perform additional functions, see note 6 supra 
and accompanying text, some discount brokers plan to expand their line of business. One 
discount broker was recently asked: ''Where will the range of services end? 'We'll do all a 
Merrill Lynch can do' .... " Shapiro, supra note 3, at 155. 
Discount brokers also commonly offer services incidental to the brokerage transaction, 
such as margin loans, money market funds and custodial services. See Shapiro, supra note 2, 
at 155 (one major discounter offers margin accounts and money market funds). The recent 
bank discount brokerage applications requested approval for a similar range of services. See 
BankAmerica Application, supra note 2, at 85,961-62 (requested approval to make margin 
loans (already legal for banks and/or brokers), pay interest on net free balances, provide safe-
keeping and accounting custodial services, sweep excess balances to a money market fund, and 
offer IRA accounts); New National Bank Subsidiary Allowed to Offer .Discount Brokerage Serv-
ices, [Current] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) ~ 99,284, at 86,256 (Aug. 26, 1982) (similar 
services) [hereinafter cited as Security Pac!fic Application]. 
8. This Note focuses primarily on the powers of national banks, with some discussion of 
bank holding companies, see note 138 infra. However, the Glass-Steagall Act sections that 
underlie this analysis, see notes 12 & 14 infra, settle the legality of discount brokerage services 
for other types of financial institutions as well. For example, 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1976) applies 
the national bank "limitations and conditions" of 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1976) to all state banks 
that are members of the Federal Reserve System. Sections 78 and 377 of title 12 apply to all 
member banks by their own terms. Section 378 of title 12 applies to any person or organiza-
tion engaged in certain aspects of the securities business and to deposit banking "to any extent 
whatever." In addition, one of its provisos ties in with 12 U.S.C. § 24(7). See note 19 infra. 
Thus, the impact of the title 12 sections examined in this Note affects institutions other than 
national banks. See generally FDIC Statement of Policy on the Applicability of the Glass-Stea-
gall Act lo Securities Activities of Subsidiaries of Insured Nonmember Banks, 47 Fed. Reg. 
38,984 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FDIC Policy Statement]. 
Several full-line securities firms have recently turned the tables by announcing their inten-
tions to buy savings and loan associations. See Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 1983, at 14, col. 1 (Merrill 
Lynch; Prudential-Bache; Thomson McKinnon). These moves appear to be spurred by the 
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tion to enter the discount brokerage business,9 and the Federal Re-
serve Board is considering a rule listing discount brokerage as an 
acceptable bank holding company activity.1° The securities industry 
FHLBB and FDIC conclusions that 12 U.S.C. §378 is the only Glass-Steagall provision argua• 
bly applicable to institutions under their supervision and that it does not bar separately incor• 
porated discount brokerage services. See FDIC Policy Statement, supra, at 38,984-85; 
Establishment of Third-Tier Service Corporation to Conduct Certain Brokerage Activities, [Cur-
rent] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,01 I at 61,026-28 (May 1982) (Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board General Counsel Opinion) [hereinafter cited as S&L Brokerage Proposal]; Broker-
age Activities for Service Corporations, [Current] FED. BANKING L. REP, (CCH) ~83,013 at 
61,034-35 (Mar. 1983) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board General Counsel Opinion) [hereinaf• 
ter cited as Brokerage Activities for Service Corporations/; see also Board of Governors of Fed• 
eral Reserve System v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 58 n.24 (1981). Sections 78 and 377 
are the only Glass-Steagall provisions dealing with affiliation and by their terms apply only to 
member banks. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377 (1976). If the analysis of the Note is correct, § 378 
would allow nonmember insured banks and savings and loan associations to establish discount 
brokerage because it does not reach such activity. 
9. In November 1981, Bank of America moved through its holding company, BankAmer• 
ica Corp., to acquire the parent of Charles Schwab & Co., a discount broker. See The banns 
are read far a bank and a broker, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1981, at 83; Friedman, Bank Bids 
$53 Million far Broker: BankAmerica Seeks Schwab in Stock Swap, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 
1981, at Dl, col. 6. The holding company applied to the Federal Reserve Board for permission 
to acquire Schwab in 1982. See BankAmerica Application, supra note 2. The Board granted 
permission in January 1983, see Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, and the acquisition has 
since been accomplished. See Carrington, supra note 1. 
Security Pacific National Bank was the next major entrant into the discount brokerage 
business. It initially announced only an "affiliation" with an existing discount broker, see Any-
thing you can do • .• , THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1981, at 90; Bennett, Banks Hail 2 Plans for 
Broker Tie: Some Wonder About Legalil)'oj'Coasl Move, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1981, at DI, 
col. 6, but subsequently sought and obtained approval to organize a new discount brokerage 
business as an operating subsidiary of the national bank. See Securil)' Pac!fic Application, 
supra note 7. Union Planters National Bank of Memphis, Tennessee, received similar approval 
from the Comptroller, see Brokerage Activities for Service Corporations, supra note 8, at 61,030. 
Many other large banks have entered the discount brokerage business through affiliation or 
otherwise. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1983, at 19, col. 1 (Citibank); Carrington, supra note 1 
(Chase Manhatten Bank); Berman, Comerica breaks new ground with brokerage service, Detroit 
Free Press, Nov. 4, 1982, at 18, col. 2; Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1982, at 15, col. 3 (First Wisconsin 
Corp.); Carrington & Gottschalk, Bank Sorties into Discount Brokerage Create Wall Street 
Fears of an Invasion, Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1982, at 4, col. 2 (Citizens & Southern National Bank; 
Crocker National Bank); Much, Chemical Bank Joins the Wall Street Club, Industry Week, 
Aug. 23, 1982, at 63. 
Several federal savings and loan associations have also proposed to enter the brokerage 
business. See S&L Brokerage Proposal, supra note 8; Brokerage Activities far Service Corpora• 
tions,supra note 8. The Securities Industry Association recently estimated that 600 depository 
institutions are already offering some form of discount brokerage. See Carrington, supra note 
I, at col. 2. The BankAmerica and Security Pacific actions have generated the most publicity 
to date. Each of these applications presents different legal questions, and together they cover 
the issues raised by the actions of other banks, so this Note will most often refer to them. 
Though this Note will focus on national banks, see note 8 supra, it will refer to different 
regulatory authorities. Specifically, the Comptroller of the Currency regulates national banks, 
see 12 U.S.C. § 161 (1976) (bank examinations), while the Federal Reserve Board regulates 
bank holding companies and their nonbanking subsidiaries. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-52 (1976). 
This difference in regulatory coverage does not impair legal analysis of the Glass-Steagall Act, 
see note 12 infra, but complicates the application of the analysis to bank holding companies, 
See note 138 infra. 
10. See Amendments to Regulation Y, 48 FED. REo. 7746 (1983) (proposed Feb. 17, 1983) 
(amending 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Rulemaking Proposal], Normally, 
if a bank holding company wishes to engage in a new, nonbanking activity, it must request 
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has contested this entry,1 1 asserting that the Glass-Steagall Act12 re-
quires separation between investment and commercial banking. 
Though the Act does mandate some division between the two lines 
of business, this Note argues that bank discount brokerage services 
do not violate the Act. 13 Part I examines the competing "accommo-
dation" and "agency" interpretations of the relevant statutory sec-
tions, concluding that the agency interpretation, which permits bank 
discount brokerage operations, is superior. Part II scrutinizes this 
interpretation in light of the policies of the Glass-Steagall Act and 
concludes that allowing discount brokerage operations is consistent 
with the statutory goals. Part III considers fairness and investor pro-
tection concerns raised by the securities industry and recommends 
that bank regulations satisfy these concerns by requiring separate in-
corporation of bank discount brokerage services. 
I. THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT 
The Glass-Steagall Act poses an interpretation problem because 
one section seems to authorize banks to engage in discount broker-
age, while three others apparently forbid such activity. 14 Section 
Board approval. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976). However, under authority of 12 U.S.C. 
§1843(b) (1976), the Board has promulgated a list of activities that are normally legal under 
§I843(c)(8). See 12 C.F.R. §225.4(a) (1982). The Board expeditiously processes applications 
to perform these activities. See 12 C.F.R. §225.4(b) (1982). The proposed rule now under 
Board consideration would add discount brokerage to the list of approved activities. See 
Rulemaking Proposal, supra. 
11. The Securities Industry Association has already filed a complaint challenging the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board's approval of a savings and loan brokerage plan. See SIA v. 
FHLBB, [Current] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) ,J 99,269 (D.D.C., No. 82-1920, filed July 11, 
1982). The Securities Industry Association has also unsuccessfully contested a bank holding 
company's application to acquire a discount brokerage firm. See Federal Reserve Board, 
supra note 3, at 105-06. The New York Stock Exchange Inc. and the Investment Company 
Institute opposed the Comptroller's approval of automatic investment services (AIS) (involv-
ing limited brokerage activities) in the mid-seventies. See New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. 
Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated as not ripe far decision sub nom. New York 
Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978). 
12. "Glass-Steagall" is the common name of ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), officially designated the Banking Act of 1933. See 12 U.S.C. 
§ 227 (1976). Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933 (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 24(7), 377, 378, and 78 (1976)), dealt with the separation of commercial and invest-
ment banking and are usually the intended reference when the name Glass-Steagall is used. 
See Senterfitt, Glass-Steagall in Perspective, 99 BANKERS MONTHLY 16, 17 (Aug. 1982); Com-
ment, Expansion of National Bank Powers: Regulatory and Judicial Precedent Under the Na-
tional Bank Act, Glass-Steagall Act, and Bank Holding Company Act, 36 Sw. L.J. 765, 779-80 
(1982); Luse & Olson, Glass-Steagall Act l)oes Not Bar Banks as Brokers, Legal Times of 
Washington, May 10, 1982, at 18, col. I, at 23 n. 2. 
13. The Note's analysis will assume that the discount brokerage operation includes ser-
vices, such as margin lending, see text at notes 65-71, 160-70 i,ifi-a, offered incidentally to the 
brokerage transaction. See note 7 supra. 
14. In discussing these four sections, this Note will refer to the United States Code provi-
sions. These Code citations, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(7), 78, 377, 378 (1976), correspond to§§ 16, 32, 
20, and 21, respectively, of the Banking Act of 1933. 
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24(7) of Title 12 of the United States Code, in enumerating the pow-
ers of national banks, provides that "[t]he business of dealing in se-
curities and stock [by a national bank] shall be limited to purchasing 
and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon 
the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its 
own account." 15 This language seems to allow the agency transac-
tions typical of discount brokerage. 16 Sections 78 and 377, however, 
prohibit management and ownership ties between banks and firms 
engaged "in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distri-
bution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of 
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other securities .... " 17 Simi-
15. 12 U.S.C. §24(7) (1976). Section 24 outlines the corporate powers of national banking 
associations. Paragraph 7 states, in pertinent part, that a national bank shall have the power: 
To exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers or agents, subject to law, 
all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; b_y 
discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evi-
dences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; 
by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes 
according to the provisions of this chapter. The business of dealing in securities and stock 
by the association shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock 
without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case 
for its own account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of securities or 
stock:.Provided, That the association may purchase for its own account investment securi-
ties under such limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the Currency may by 
regulation prescribe. In no event shall the total amount of the investment securities of any 
one obligor or maker, held by the association for its own account, exceed at any time 10 
per centum of its capital stock actually paid in and unimpaired and IO per cent um of its 
unimpaired surplus fund . . . . As used in this section the term "investment securities" 
shall mean marketable obligations, evidencing indebtedness of any person, copartnership, 
association, or corporation in the form of bonds, notes and/or debentures commonly 
known as investment securities under such further definition of the term "investment se-
curities" as may by regulation be prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency. Except 
as hereinafter provided or otherwise permitted by law, nothing herein contained shall 
authorize the purchase by the association for its own account of any shares of stock of any 
corporation. 
12 u.s.c. § 24(7) (1976). 
National banks "cannot rightfully exercise any power except those expressly granted, or 
which are incidental to carrying on the business for which they are established." California 
Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 366 (1897) (citing Logan County Natl. Bank v. Townsend, 139 
U.S. 67, 73 (1891)). See also First Natl. Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656 (1924). 
16. Regarding an earlier and more limited form of discount brokerage, two commentators 
said: "Uncertainty about the legality of AIS [automatic investment service] plans does not 
stem from the literal language of Glass-Steagall .... Even the New York Stock Exchange, 
which brought suit in order to stop AIS plans, was hard pressed to deny that the Act's literal 
language permitted the plans." Clark & Saunders, Glass-Steaga/1 Revised: The Impact on 
Banks, Capital Markets, and the Small Investor, 97 BANKING L.J. 811, 815 (1980); see New 
York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated as not ripe for 
decision sub nom. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978). 
17. Section 78 provides in full as follows: 
No officer, director, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated association, no 
partner or employee of any partnership, and no individual, primarily engaged in the issue, 
floatation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through 
syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities, shall serve the same 
time as an officer, director, or employee of any member bank except in limited classes of 
cases in which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may allow such 
service by general regulations when in the judgment of the said Board it would not unduly 
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larly, section 378 prohibits any person or organization "engaged in 
the business of issuing, underwriting, selling or distributing, at 
wholesale or retail, . . . stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other 
securities" from also engaging in deposit banking. 18 The phrases 
"public sale" of securities and "selling . . . at retail" of securities 
arguably preclude banks from acting as brokers for the general pub-
lic.19 Although sections 78, 377, and 378 apparently operate at cross 
influence the investment policies of such member bank or the advice it gives its customers 
regarding investments. 
12 U.S.C. § 78 (1976). The exception clause at the end suggests that the section is primarily 
concerned with conflicts of interest. See also Clark & Saunders,supra note 16, at 826 (discuss-
ing potential conflicts of interest in the private placement activities of banks). 
Section 377 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
After one year from June 16, 1933, no member bank shall be affiliated in any manner 
described in subsection (b) of section 221a of this title with any corporation, association, 
business trust, or other similar organization engaged principal).y in the issue, floatation, 
underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate par-
ticipation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities. . . . 
12 U.S.C. § 377 (1976). Section 22la(b) provides that an affiliate shall include subsidiaries, 
firms with common ownership or same directors as the bank, and holding companies. See 12 
U.S.C. § 22la(b) (1976). The test is direct or indirect majority control or majority identity of 
directors. 
18. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1976). Section 378 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(a) After the expiration of one year after June 16, 1933, it shall be unlawful -
(1) For any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust or other similar organi-
zation, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at whole-
sale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other 
securities to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of receiving 
deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of 
deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor: Provided, That the 
provisions of this paragraph shall not prohibit national banks or State banks or trust com-
panies (whether or not members of the Federal Reserve System) or other financial institu-
tions or private bankers from dealing in, underwriting, purchasing, and selling investment 
securities, or issuing securities, to the extent permitted to national banking associations by 
the provisions of section 24 of this title . . . . 
12 U.S.C. § 378 (1976). This section is a criminal statute that provides for punishment of 
willful violations by fines up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment up to five years. See 12 U.S.C. 
§ 378(b) (1976). . 
19. Two commentators have argued, however, that§ 378 allows banks to engage in agency 
transactions because it permits national banks to buy and sell "investment securities . . . to the 
extent permitted ... by the provisions of[§ 24(7)]." 12 U.S.C. § 378 (I916);see note l8supra; 
Luse & Olson, supra note 12, at 23, col. I. Luse and Olson contend that because§ 378 refers to 
investment securities, which are by nature debt instruments, Congress intended to permit bro-
kerage transactions involving equity securities. They base this reasoning on the fact that 
§ 24(7) authorizes purchases and sales of "investment securities and stocks solely upon the 
order, and for the account of customers .... " 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1976) (emphasis added); see 
note 15 supra. If Congress intended § 378 to preclude purchases and sales of equity as well as 
debt securities, that prohibition would be inconsistent with the permissive language of§ 24(7). 
Luse & Olson, supra note 12, at 23, col. I. Similarly, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion has stated that "[t]he exception for dealing in securities upon the order of customers is 
incorporated into the first paragraph of [§ 378] and thus applies to member and nonmember 
banks alike." FDIC Policy Statement, supra note 8, at 38,985 n.3. · 
However, § 24(7) specifically uses the term "investment securities" in the course of granting 
the Comptroller authority to allow a bank to "purchase for its own account investment securi-
ties." 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1976). Combining the proviso in§ 378 with the specific language of 
§ 24(7) lends support to the conclusion that banks can buy and sell "investment securities" 
with the Comptroller's permission - it does not indicate that § 378 is so inconsistent with 
§ 24(7) that it must be read to permit agency transactions. 
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purposes with section 24(7), Congress intended the four together to 
"approach the legislative goal of separating the securities business 
from the banking business."20 
Two interpretations have been advanced to reconcile these provi-
sions. The "accommodation theory" would permit banks to execute 
brokerage services for existing customers,21 but would prohibit gen-
eral public solicitation of brokerage clients.22 This approach inter-
prets the prohibitions against "public sale" in sections 78 and 377, 
and against "selling . . . at retail" in section 378 to encompass solici-
tations of the public at large. The accommodation theory then reads 
20. Board of-Governors of Federal Reserve System v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 62 
(1981); see notes 45-52 infra and accompanying text. Section 24(7) limits the securities activi-
ties in which banks can engage. Section 378 prohibits a securities firm from engaging in the 
banking business. 450 U.S. at 62. Sections 77 and 377 complete the separation by prohibiting 
the common managment or common ownership of a bank and a securities firm. See generally 
Clark & Saunders, Judicial Interpretation of Glass-Steagall· The Need for Legislative Action, 91 
BANKING LJ. 721, 727-28 (1980). 
This separation of activities has a meandering statutory history. The National Bank Act 
was silent on the power of banks to deal in securities. See The National Bank Act, ch. 100, § 8, 
13 Stat. 99, IOI (1864). Construing the corporate powers strictly, see note 15 supra, the 
Supreme Court read this omission as prohibiting a national bank from dealing in stocks for its 
own account. See First Natl. Bank v. National Exchange Bank, 92 U.S. 122, 128 (1875) (pro-
hibition implied from failure to grant the power); California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 
367, 370 (1897). State banks, however, started to engage in various aspects of the securities 
business, often through their trust departments. See Perkins, The /Jivorce of Commercial and 
Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483, 487-89 (1971). Federally chartered na-
tional banks responded to this competitive challenge by setting up securities affiliates. Id. at 
489-90. 
The McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified in scattered sections of 12 
U.S.C.), provided a belated legal foundation for these national bank affiliates. This Act, in the 
words of a supporter, "contain[ed] no grant of poy,er at all to national banks to engage in the 
purchase and sale of investment securities, and merely recognize[d] the existing practice ..•• " 
68 CONG. REC. 3580 (1927) (remarks of Sen. Pepper). It allowed banks to buy and sell "with• 
out recourse marketable obligations evidencing indebtedness . . • in the form of bonds, notes 
and/or debentures, commonly known as investment securities .... " McFadden Act, ch. 191, 
§ 2(b), 44 Stat. 1224, 1226 (1927). The Act, which was mainly concerned with branch banking, 
see Perkins, supra, at 493-95, left many questions unanswered. It did not define the scope of 
the "existing practice," or whether banks could perform these services directly without the use 
of affiliates. 
Congress added the four sections at issue here in part to cut back on the latitude given 
banks by the McFadden Act. See notes 45-52 infra and accompanying text. 
21. "Existing customers" are those who come to the bank for a service other than broker-
age. The term does not have precise conceptual boundaries but is meant to distinguish those 
members of the general public who would be attracted to the bank by and use only the dis-
count brokerage services. See New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 
(D.D.C. 1975), vacated as not ripe for decision sub nom. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 
562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978) (accommodation requires that 
customer relations exist independently of service). 
22. See New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (D.D.C. 1975), 
vacated as not ripe far decision sub nom. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978); Security Pac!ftc Application, supra note 7, at 
86,256-57; Luse & Olson, supra note 12, at 22, col. 1. This theory is often read to prohibit 
banks from making a profit on the transaction, thus compelling them to price their brokerage 
services at cost. For an explanation of the origin of the at-cost limitation and analysis of its 
validity, see notes 32-33 infra. 
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section 24(7) as a narrow exception to the general prohibition: A 
bank can execute brokerage transactions only for "customers" who 
have a preexisting, nonbrokerage relationship with the bank. This 
theory, at one time advanced by the Comptroller of the Currency,23 
has since been advocated by representatives of the securities indus-
try24 and might effectively prevent banks from operating discount 
brokerage services. 25 
The "agency" interpretation of these sections emphasizes that 
discount brokers do not sell their own securities; they sell their serv-
ices.26 According to agency theory, section 24(7) permits a bank to 
sell its services, as a broker-agent, to anyone. The agency approach 
holds that section 24(7)'s limitation language, which allows a na-
tional bank to deal in securities and stock "solely upon the order, 
and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own ac-
count," does not limit the bank's potential brokerage clients,27 but 
only bars a bank from dealing for its own account.28 The three other 
23. The Comptroller stated in 1933 that bank agency transactions in securities were an 
"accommodation" service especially important to rural areas. See 1933 ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 11. In 1935, the Comptroller restated this interpreta-
tion in explaining minor changes in § 24(7). Hearings on R.R. 5357 Before the House Commit-
tee on Banking and Currency, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1935) (statement of J.F.T. O'Connor, 
Comptroller of the Currency). Subsequent Comptrollers have abandoned this position. See 
note 32 infra. 
24. See sources cited in note 22 supra. 
25. At least a bank could not advertise the service, or offer it to anyone but its preexisting 
customers. 
26. In discussing a more limited bank brokerage plan, the district court for the District of 
Columbia stated that "[these limited brokerage] banks merely sell a service to customers who 
have independently chosen a form of investment. Banks which offer to deduct automatically 
from a customer's account utility bills or mortgage payments are not selling electricity or mort-
gages; banks offering to deduct security purchases are not selling securities." New York Stock 
Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404F. Supp. 1091, 1099 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated as not ripe far decision sub 
nom. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 
U.S. 942 (1978). Another commentator describes the brokerage business as service oriented: 
Firms in the securities brokerage industry buy and sell stocks and bonds for their custom-
ers. In the representative transaction, brokerage houses do not own the securities chang-
ing hands. Thus, rather than selling securities, the firms sell a service, securities 
brokerage. In consideration for this service, brokers charge both buyers and sellers a 
commission based upon the value of the securities involved in each transaction. 
L. SHEPARD, supra note 6, at 3; see generally notes 2-7 supra and accompanying text. Unlike 
the automatic investment service plan at issue in Smith, however, recent bank discount broker-
age announcements have stated that the banks will not merely deduct purchases from ac-
counts, but will also make margin loans. See note 7 supra. 
27. The notion that brokerage services are legal only if offered to customers, and that one 
can become a customer simply by having the service offered to him may seem circular. How-
ever, a "customer'' in normal business practice is any person presently willing to purchase a 
service, and not only one who has had previous business dealings with the bank. See note 21 
supra. 
28. Both the accommodation and agency interpretations agree that § 24(7) prohibits banks 
from dealing for their own account. This prohibition is at first stated flatly, but subsequent 
provisos limit its application. See note 15 supra. The first proviso is that "the association may 
purchase for its own account investment securities under such limitations and restrictions as 
the Comptroller of the Currency may by regulation prescribe." 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1976). The 
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sections would still retain their vitality under this approach: Banks 
still could not publicly sell stock and securities as principals, nor 
could banks have ownership or management ties with firms that do 
sell as principals.29 The agency interpretation imputes an essential 
function to each section without straining the meaning of "cus-
tomer'' by modifying it with the implied term "preexisting."30 
One court has applied the agency interpretation to a more limited 
bank brokerage plan.31 In addition, current regulatory authorities 
Comptroller's regulations appear in 12 C.F.R. § I (1982). These regulations permit banks to 
deal in, underwrite, purchase and sell without limitation for their own account certain govern-
ment obligations, while other government agency securities may be subject to limitations on 
amount held, as well as possible prohibitions on dealing or underwriting. See 12 C.F.R. § I 
(1982); see also 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1976). This three-tier system is based on the nature of the 
security and is described briefly in Karmel, Glass-Steagall· Some Critical Reflections, 97 BANK• 
ING L.J. 631, 633-34 (1980). 
29. Even under an agency interpretation § 378 would still retain its function by prohibiting 
firms that underwrite or deal for their own account from engaging in banking activities. 
The Federal Reserve Board has given these sections another interpretation. The Board 
noted that "public sale" in §§ 78 and 378 appeared in the middle of terms like "issue," "flota-
tion," "underwriting" and "distribution." Under the rules of statutory construction, words 
listed in a group are often given a related meaning. See, e.g., Third Natl. Bank in Nashville v. 
Impac Ltd., 432 U.S. 312,322 (1977). Thus, the Board reasons that this group of terms "gener-
ally refer[s] to the process by which new issues or large blocks of securities are distributed to 
the public, not to brokerage functions, which are primarily concerned with the transfer of 
securities at the request of a particular customer. The term 'public sale' used in association 
with this series of terms should be given a meaning similar to those terms .... " Federal 
Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 114 (footnote omitted). The Board also suggested that the 
failure of § 377 to include the term "brokerage" in its language belied an intention to ban 
profit-oriented agency businesses. Id. Through this interpretation, the 'Board found that 
Glass-Steagall did not preclude a bank holding company from acquiring a discount brokerage 
operation. See also note 36 infra. 
One could argue that a "natural" interpretation of the other three sections would permit 
discount brokerage as the selling of securities. The textual argument may be open to a charge 
of semantic shuffling at this point, but Part II demonstrates that the policies of Glass-Steagall 
and an accurate analysis of discount brokerage ultimately support this interpretation. In other 
words, Part II establishes that within the framework of Glass-Steagall the initially debatable 
distinction between selling one's own securities and selling someone else's becomes dispositive. 
30. Early Comptrollers effectively included this implied term. See note 32 infra. If the 
Glass-Steagall Congress had really intended this meaning, it would have modified "customer" 
with "preexisting" instead of emphasizing the prohibition on transactions for the bank's own 
account. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. This observation is especially significant 
because Congress inserted the word "customer'' in 1933. The earlier regulation of bank activi-
ties, the McFadden Act, did not contain the term: 
Provided, That the business of buying and selling investment securities shall hereafter 
be limited to buying and selling without recourse marketable obligations evidencing in-
debtedness of any person, copartnership, association, or corporation, in the form of bonds, 
notes and/or debentures, co=only known as investment securities, under such further 
definition of the term 'investment securities' as may by regulation be prescribed by the 
Comptroller of the Currency . . . . 
McFadden Act, ch. 191, sec. 2(b), 44 Stat. 1224, 1226 (1927) (current version at§ 24(7) (1976)). 
31. See New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091, 1099 (D.D.C, 1975), 
vacated as not ripe far decision sub nom. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978). In this case, the Comptroller had infor-
mally expressed his approval of bank automatic investment services, (AIS), see Bank Automatic 
Investment Services (1973-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) ~ 96,272 (June 
IO, 1974) (Letter from Comptroller James E. Smith to G. Duane Vieth) [hereinafter cited as 
Bank AIS], and the securities industry challenged the approval. The services at issue involved 
May 1983] Note - Bank Discount Brokerage Services 1507 
have accepted the legality of bank discount brokerage services even 
when those services involve the public solicitation of new clients.32 
the montly deduction from checking account balances of sums for the purchase of stock. The 
bank would present a list of 25 stocks to its AIS customers, and the customers would choose 
the stocks they wished to purchase. The bank would then pool the orders and execute them 
through a broker. By pooling, the bank paid a lower commission then an individual customer 
relying on a broker would have. See 404 F. Supp. at 1092-93. Though AIS users were by 
definition checking account customers, the court refused to apply the accommodation theory. 
See 404 F. Supp. at 1097-98. The plaintiff securities representatives had wanted to impose a 
nonprofit restriction on the service, see 404 F. Supp. at 1097, but the court saw this bank 
activity as a normal sale of services. See 404 F. Supp. at 1099. The court noted that a literal 
reading of § 24(7) 
permits national banks to purchase and sell securities if (1) the bank acts as agent for a 
customer, (2) the transactions are without recourse, (3) the transactions are initiated solely 
upon the order of the customer, and (4) the transactions are for the account of the cus-
tomer and not for the bank's account. 
404 F. Supp. at 1097. This reading of§ 24(7) would also permit discount brokerage. See 
notes 2-7 supra and accompanying text. 
32. See Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 114-15; Security Pacific Application, supra 
note 7 (Comptroller of Currency); S & L Brokerage Proposal, supra note 8 (Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board); FDIC Policy Statement, supra note 8. 
The weight that should be given to this regulatory approval is not clear. While the 
Supreme Court has relied extensively on regulatory rulings in the banking area, see, e.g., 
Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 56-58 (1981) (particular Board deter-
mination "entitled to the greatest deference") (footnote omitted); Investment Co. Inst. v. 
Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971) (more deference due when regulator issues "deliberative" 
opinions than when an explanation does not accompany an interpretation), the regulatory his-
tory of bank brokerage services is somewhat convoluted. 
The Comptroller originally used the term "accommodation" to describe the scope of per-
missible brokerage activities under§ 24(7). See note 23 supra. The Comptroller adopted this 
interpretation shortly after the passage of Glass-Steagall; in resolving ambiguous sections, the 
courts ordinarily give great weight to regulatory interpretations made contemporaneously with 
enactment. National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 145 (1920); cf. NLRB v. Bell 
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974) Qegislative inaction subsequent to an agency ruling 
signals tacit legislative approval of the agency's interpretation of the statute). A later Comp-
troller noted, however, that "neither the word nor the idea of the 'accommodation' limitation 
appears in the statute or in any committee or floor comments." Bank AIS, supra note 31, at 
81,358. In 1935, the word "accommodation" worked its way into the history of§ 24(7). The 
Comptroller, commenting on a small change to§ 24(7) imposed by the Banking Act of 1935, 
ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1976)) stated that the revision 
"makes it clear that[§ 24(7)] of the Banking Act of 1933 was not intended to prohibit national 
banks . . . from buying or selling stock for the account of their customers and as an accommo-
dation thereto and not for their own account." Hearings on H.R 5357 Before the House Com-
millee on Banking and Currency, 14th Cong., 1st Sess. 633 (1935) (Statement of J.F.T. 
O'Connor, Comptroller of the Currency) (emphasis added), reprinted in Bank AIS, supra note 
31, at 81,358. Though Congress approved the revision, allowing banks to buy stocks as well as 
securities on behalf of their customers, neither House nor Senate Report used the term accom-
modation. See H.R. REP. No. 742, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1935); S. REP. No. 1007, 74th 
Cong. 1st Sess. 17 (1935). 
The Comptroller did not actually explain what he meant by "accommodation" until 1936. 
Banks could only perform the "accommodation" service for existing customers, without any 
extension of credit, and only on a nonprofit basis. 1 Bull of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
No. 2 at 2-3 (Oct. 21, 1936). In 1957, the Comptroller relaxed the nonprofit limitation, but 
retained the preexisting customer requirement. See Comptroller of the Currency, DIGEST OF 
OPINIONS RELATING TO NATIONAL BANKS,~ 220A (1957), quoted in Bank AIS, supra note 31, 
at 81,357. In 1961, the Comptroller replaced the DIGEST OF OPINIONS with a COMPTROLLER'S 
MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS. This MANUAL has never defined the scope of bank broker-
age activities. See BankAIS,supra note 31, at 81,357. Recent Comptrollers have rejected the 
accommodation theory completely, terming it ''ultra-conservative" and a reflection of "the 
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More important, the Supreme Court assumed in Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System v. Agnew33 that section 78, which pro-
hibits common management between national banks and firms that 
engage in the "public sale . . . of stock, bonds, or other similar se-
curities,"34 does not encompass brokerage activities.35 Though the 
Court in Agnew assumed rather than ruled on the scope of the "pub-
lic sale" language, the case strongly implies that sections 78 and 377 
great caution of banking regulations in the years immediately following the 1931-2 debacle." 
Bank AIS, supra note 31, at 81,358, 81,360; see Security Pac!ftc Application, supra note 7, at 
86,257. 
Unfortunately, the judgment of recent Comptrollers has been, if anything, overexpansive. 
From 1966 to 1976, courts have repeatedly overruled Comptroller rulings that allowed banks 
to expand their activities. See e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (mutual 
fund); First Natl. Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969) {armored car branch bank services): 
Arnold Tours, Inc. of Arizona v. Valley Natl. Bank, 604 F.2d 32 {9th Cir. 1979), mod(lj,ing 411 
F. Supp. 308 (D. Ariz. 1976) {data processing); Georgia Assn. of Ind. Ins. Agents, Inc. v. 
Saxon, 268 F. Supp. 236 {N.D. Ga. 1967), qffd sub nom. Saxon v. Georgia Assn. of Ind, Ins. 
Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010 {5th Cir. 1968) {insurance agency); Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon, 
261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966), qffd sub nom. Port of New York Auth. v. Baker, Watts & Co., 
392 F.2d 497 {D.C. Cir. 1968) (underwriting municipal revenue bonds). Though one court has 
approved regulatory rejection of the acco=odation theory, see New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. 
Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated as not ripe for decision sub nom. New York 
Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 {D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978), the 
weight courts should give to this rejection remains unclear. The position of the Federal Re-
serve Board best demonstrates the current regulatory confusion. The Board now accepts the 
agency theory. It claims to have ruled consistently since 1936 that § 78 does not bar bank 
brokerage activities, see Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 114, implying that the Board 
has always accepted the agency theory. Yet in 1936, the Board had explicitly accepted the 
Comptroller's limitations on bank brokerage activities. 1935 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD 
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 56 (1936), quoted in Bank AIS, supra note 
31, at 81,358. The legislative and regulatory history of Glass-Steagall thus offers little gui-
dance; a different maxim for statutory construction exists for each twist in the history, with 
each maxim leading to different results. 
33. 329 U.S. 441 (1947). 
34. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1976); see note 17 supra. 
35. The Court considered whether a firm was "primarily engaged" in securities activities 
for purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 78. 329 U.S. at 446-49. If the Court had found that the firm 
engaged primarily in activities defined in § 78, then that section's co=on management pro-
scription would have prevented any of the firm's employees from serving as a director of a 
national bank. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. 
In the fiscal year ending in February, 1944, the firm derived 32% of its gross income from 
underwriting and 47% from brokerage activities. 329 U.S. at 445. If the Court had included 
brokerage services along with dealing and underwriting, it would have held that the firm ob-
tained over half of its income from activities prohibited by§ 78. See note 17 supra and accom-
panying text. Yet the Court evidently did not conclude that brokerage activities fell within the 
scope of § 78. In fact, the Court indicated that the underwriting field encompassed the sec-
tion's "public sale" language. 329 U.S. at 445 n.3; cf. note 29 supra {similar interpretation by 
the Federal Reserve Board). This analysis is consistent with the Court of Appeals opinion, in 
which Judge Prettyman noted that the Federal Reserve Board, in 1945, considered "issue, 
flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution, at wholesale or retail or through syndicate 
participation of stocks, bonds or other similar securities" as meaning "underwriting." See 
Agnew v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 153 F.2d 785, 787 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 
1946), revd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 441 (1947). The court further noted that 
"[u]nderwriting and brokerage, although both concerned with securities, are vastly different 
operations." 153 F.2d at 790. Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals thus ex-
cluded brokerage services from the "public sale" language of 12 U.S.C. § 78. 
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do not prohibit bank brokerage activities.36 More recent Supreme 
Court analysis supports this conclusion, although dicta in two cases 
can be read to support either the accommodation or the agency 
theory.37 
Apparent judicial acceptance of the agency interpretation as-
sumes greater significance in light of several flaws inherent in the 
accommodation theory. First, as noted before, the theory requires 
that "customer" in section 24(7) be read as "preexisting customer."38 
36. "[I]f brokerage were involved within the type of securities actively prohibited by (12 
U.S.C. § 78], there would have been no issue to decide in Agnew." Luse & Olson, supra note 
12, at 23, col 1. 
37. In Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971), the Court analyz.ed the underly-
ing concerns of Glass-Steagall as applied to bank entry into the mutual investment fund busi-
ness. After a thorough discussion of the abuses leading to passage of the Act, the Court 
concluded: 
These are all hazards that are not present when a bank undertakes to purchase stock for 
the account of its individual customers. . . . [This purchasing activity], unlike the opera-
tion of an investment fund, do[es] not give rise to a promotion or salesman's stake in a 
particular investment; . . . [it] do[es] not entail a threat to public confidence in the bank 
itself; and [it does] not impair the bank's ability to give disinterested service as a fiduciary 
or managing agent. In short, there is a plain difference between the sale of fiduciary services 
and the safe of investments. 
401 U.S. at 638 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Similarly, the Court noted in Board of 
Governors v. Investment Co. Inst, 450 U.S. 46, 63 (1981) (ICI-11) that "[t]he management of a 
customer's investment portfolio - even when the manager has the power to sell securities 
owned by the customer - is not the kind of selling activity that Congress contemplated when 
it enacted[§ 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1976)]." This language apparently 
supports very broad brokerage powers for banks that do not deal as principals. 
In spite of its broad language and favorable holding, ICI-II also stated that § 378 ''was 
intended to require securities firms such as underwriters or brokerage houses to sever their 
banking connections." 450 U.S. at 63 (emphasis added). The Securities Industry Association 
has argued that this phrase limits bank brokerage activities, but the Federal Reserve Board 
dismissed the dicta as a "passing remark" upon which reliance was "misplaced." Federal Re-
serve Board, supra note 3, at 116 n.54. The Board noted that I CI-II did not consider broker-
age activity alone, and that most "brokerage houses" also perform other functions such as 
dealing or market making. Other statements in both Camp and I CI-II are superficially rele-
vant, but they also suffer from inconsistency. Compare ICI-II, 450 U.S. at 55 ("[A] bank 
regularly buys and sells securities for its customers.") and Camp, 401 U.S. at 624-25 ("No 
provision of the banking law suggests that it is improper for a national bank . . . to purchase 
stock for the account of its customers.") with I CI-II, 450 U.S. at 70 (Glass-Steagall's purpose 
was to separate "as completely as possible commercial from investment banking") and Camp, 
401 U.S. at 629-30 (Congress was concerned with banks' "direct and indirect involvement in 
the trading and ownership of speculative securities.") (footnote omitted). 
In fact, one could easily rely on dicta from the relevant cases to conclude that Glass-Stea-
gall does not bar bank discount brokerage operations. Agnew's assumption that § 78's "public 
sale" language does not encompass brokerage activities, see notes 33-36 supra and accompany-
ing text, arguably applies to § 377's "public sale" language as well. See also note 29 supra 
(federal Reserve Board interpretation of "public sale"). Under this approach, only § 378 re-
mains to limit the agency language of § 24(7). This last restriction arguably vanishes in a 
loosely worded footnote in ICI-II where the Court stated that "[§ 378] cannot be read to 
include within its prohibition separate organizations related by ownership with a bank . . . ." 
450 U.S. at 58 n.24. Since § 378 would therefore not include a bank subsidiary, a subsidiary 
could engage in brokerage activity without any problem. However, reliance on these snatches 
oflanguage does little to advance the analysis of the problem. This Note assumes that a supe-
rior justification for allowing discount brokerage services lies in an examination of the policies 
underlying the Glass-Steagall Act See Part II i'?fra. 
38. See notes 21 & 30 supra and accompanying text. 
1510 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:1498 
Second, this implied modifier is an unworkable limitation because a 
bank can avoid it simply by requiring a prospective client to open up 
an account before using the bank's brokerage services.39 Third, the 
distinction drawn by the theory seems nonsensical because it would 
simply limit discount brokerage activities to those banks with many 
preexisting customers. No one could seriously argue that such a lim-
itation would handicap the Bank of America.40 
In addition, the accommodation theory raises serious statutory 
and constitutional questions to the extent that it improperly limits 
public advertisement of discount brokerage services. The Supreme 
Court has already rejected, on statutory grounds, state restrictions on 
bank advertising because it could not accept the notion "that the in-
cidental powers granted to national banks should be construed so 
narrowly as to preclude the use of advertising in any branch of their 
authorized business."41 The Court has also indicated its willingness 
to control regulation of commercial speech on constitutional 
39. A requirement, for example, that a small savings or checking account be opened before 
establishing a brokerage relationship would be meaningless. A prohibition against opening an 
account just for the purpose of securing brokerage services would also be unenforceable, since 
the customer's intent could not be ascertained. Such prohibitions would be nothing more than 
restrictions on effective marketing of an admittedly authorized activity. Luse & Olson, supra 
note 12, at 22, col. 2. See also New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 
(D.D.C. 1975), vacated as not ripe for decision sub nom. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 
562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978). 
40. In 1980, for example, the Bank of America had 1.3 million VISA and Mastercharge 
cardholders, plus depositors. See Bank of America expands automated card program, 72 A.B.A. 
BANKING J. 110, 110 {Sept. 1980). 
41. Franklin Natl. Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 377 (1954). The case presented the 
"narrow question whether federal statutes which authorize national banks to receive savings 
deposits conflict with New York legislation which prohibits them from using the word 'saving' 
or 'savings' in their advertising or business." 347 U.S. at 374. Section 24 of the Federal Re-
serve Act, as amended by the McFadden Act, ch. 191, § 16, 44 Stat. pt. 2 1224, 1232-33 (1927) 
(amended 1974, 88 Stat. 716, 725, codified as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1976)), permitted 
national banks "to receive time and savings deposits"; 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) grants national banks 
power "[t]o exercise ... all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the busi-
ness of banking ... by receiving deposits .... " Neither of these statutes expressly autho-
rizes advertising of any service, let alone the advertising of savings accounts or the use of the 
word "savings." Nevertheless, the Court found advertising necessary within the scope of 
§ 24(7)'s incidental powers clause. The Court refused to 
construe the two Federal Acts as permitting only a passive acceptance of deposits thrust 
upon [national banks]. Modem competition for business finds advertising one of the most 
usual and useful of weapons .... It would require some affirmative indication to justify 
an interpretation that would permit a national bank to engage in a business but gave no 
right to let the public know about it. 
347 U.S. at 377-79. Thus the Court followed a two-step analysis: first it isolated the statutory 
authority for a function, then applied a strong presumption in favor of advertising that func-
tion. Here the presumption, though implied from the incidental powers clause of§ 24(7), was 
strong enough to override conflicting state law under the Supremacy Clause. 
Application of this two-part analysis suggests that banks can advertise their brokerage serv-
ices. First, even the accommodation theory acknowledges that § 24(7) authorizes banks to 
conduct some brokerage transactions. Absent any "affirmative indication" to the contrary 
then, banks can advertise discount brokerage services. 
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grounds.42 Because bank advertising is difficult to limit, and because 
banks can easily avoid the "preexisting customer" requirement, the 
accommodation theory reduces to a single restriction: banks cannot 
make a profit on their discount brokerage business.43 This conclu-
sion is :qot supported by Glass-Steagall's sparse legislative history, 
which indicates that banks can continue to off er profitable brokerage 
services just as they had before the Act.44 
Given the consistency of bank discount brokerage services with 
Agnew's interpretation of Glass-Steagall and the problems posed by 
the invocation of customer "accommodation," no interpretative rea-
son favors the accommodation theory over an agency rationale. The 
courts should adopt the agency interpretation to the extent that it is 
consistent with the goals of Glass-Steagall. 
II. BANK DISCOUNT BROKERAGE SERVICES AND THE POLICIES 
OF THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT 
This Part analyzes whether bank discount brokerage operations 
conflict with the purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act. If the agency 
interpretation is consistent with the goals of the statute, then Glass-
Steagall poses no legal bar to banks offering discount brokerage 
services. Analysis of these goals demonstrates that Glass-Steagall 
does not, in fact, bar these services. The Act prevents abuses that 
bank agency brokerage transactions simply do not cause. 
The broad goal of the statute was "to protect bank depositors 
from any repetition of the widespread bank closings that occurred 
during the Great Depression."45 The major feature of the Act, the 
42. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748 (1976). In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 563-
66 (1980), the Court developed a four-part analysis for evaluating government regulations of 
co=erical speech: 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amend-
ment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern law-
ful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental 
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine 
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether 
it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 
447 U.S. at 566. The application of these steps to bank brokerage activities is straightforward. 
As the acco=odation theory concedes, banks can conduct some brokerage activities. Thus, 
the speech would concern a "lawful activity." The inquiry concerning governmental interests 
is conducted in Part II of this Note. These alleged interests, the policies of the Glass-Steagall 
Act, are not implicated at all by bank discount brokerage services. In fact, no governmental 
unit is asserting these interests; the relevant regulatory agencies are willing to permit bank 
advertising of brokerage services. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. 
43. See notes 22, 32 supra. 
44. See note 49 infra. 
45. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 
46, 61 (1981). See also Clark & Saunders, supra note 18, at 723, 725 ("By 1933, nearly 9,000 
U.S. banks had failed, largely due to the enormous stock markets losses which the banks had 
sustained from speculative investments."); Note, A Conduct-Oriented Approach to the Glass-
Steagall Act, 91 YALE L.J. 102, 103 (1981); Co=ent, supra note 12, at 779. 
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creation of federal deposit insurance,46 aimed to achieve this goal by 
increasing depositor confidence in the banking system.47 Congress 
intended the provisions at issue here to protect depositors by divorc-
ing commercial from investment banking, and in so doing, to avoid 
undue risks in commercial banking.48 Unfortunately, Congress 
never discussed the extent to which brokerage activities increase 
these risks. The legislative history details the particular activities -
such as underwriting and dealing - that Congress clearly meant to 
separate from commercial banking, but it barely touches upon the 
scope of permissible brokerage operations.49 In Investment Co. Inst. 
46. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 
U.S. 46, 61 n.27 (1981); J. WHITE, BANK.ING LAW 319 (1976) ("The Act's most controversial 
provisions, those creating the FDIC, overshadowed the provisions relevant to the [Camp) 
case."). 
47. A leading banking lawyer has stated that "investment banking co=unity insulation 
was an incidental side effect of legislation passed almost a half century ago that was mainly 
intended to protect bank depositors and restore public confidence in the co=ercial banking 
system. OfGlass-Steagall's 34 sections, only S deal with securities matters - and then only in 
relation to protecting domestic depositors of banks." Angermueller, Commercial vs. investment 
bankers: 17ze Case For, 55 HARV. Bus. R.Ev., Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 132, 133-34. 
48. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 
U.S. 46, 61-62 (1981); Sametz, Background of the Controversy over Banks' Securities Activities 
-A Briefing, in SECURITIES ACTIVlTIES OF COMMERICAL BANKS 3-4 (A. Sametz ed. 1981) 
("Clearly the purpose of the prohibitions concerning the structure of bank assets was to safe-
guard the 'soundness' of banks through the protection of the resources of the banking system • 
• . . "); Senterfitt,supra note 12, at 18 ("Quite obviously, the concern uppermost in the mind of 
the Congress when it included [the four securities sections] in the [Glass-Steagall Act) was to 
stop the tidal wave of bank failures and to prevent such failures in the future."). 
49. See Federal Reserve Board,supra note 3, at 115 (concluding that since harmful activi-
ties were "exhaustively catalogued,'' while brokerage activities were rarely discussed, the Act 
did not intend to prohibit bank brokerage services). 
The only discussion of the crucial § 24(7) language occurs in several co=ittee reports. 
The 1932 Senate Report states: "National banks are to be permitted to purchase and sell in-
vestment securities for their own customers to the same extent as heretofore •..• " S. REP. 
No. 585, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1932) (emphasis added); see S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 16 (1933) (similar language); H.R. REP. No. 150, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1933) (similar 
language); Luse & Olson,supra note 12, at 22, col. 1 (co=ittee reports constitute only legisla-
tive history that co=ents on § 24(7)). Unfortunately, determining the scope of brokerage 
activities before 1933 is an almost impossible task. Several authorities point to a series of cases 
admitting extensive bank brokerage activities. See New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404 
F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (D.D.C. 1975) (cases indicate more extensive brokerage activity than the 
acco=odation theory would allow), vacated as not ripe for decision sub nom. New York Stock 
Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978); Security 
Pactftc Application, supra note 7, at 86,258. Only one case cited, however, did not involve a 
preexisting customer relationship with the bank. See Greenfield v. Clarence Sav. Bank of 
Clarence, 5 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928) (client left $2,000 with the bank to purchase bonds 
through the bank). The remaining cases did not even focus on the legality of bank brokerage 
activities. See, e.g., Blakely v. Brinson, 286 U.S. 254 (1932); McNair v. Davis, 68 F.2d 935 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 647 (1934); Mark v. Westlin, 48 F.2d 609 (D. Minn. 1931); Dyer v. 
Broadway Natl. Bank, 252 N.Y. 430, 433, 169 N.E. 630, 635 (1930) (recognized that banks 
purchased stocks for customers). In any event, these cases certainly did not deal with broker-
age activities on the scale of discount brokerage. q. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404 
F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (D.D.C. 1975) (cases do not reveal operations as extensive as the AIS plan 
at issue, though they do indicate an agency role for banks), vacated as not ripe for decision sub 
nom. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 
U.S 942 (1978). Given the uncertain scope of these cases, and the corresponding uncertainty in 
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v. Camp,50 however, the Supreme Court analyzed in detail the par-
ticular risks and abuses that Congress intended to eliminate in sepa-
rating commercial from investment banking.51 The risks guarded 
against range from " 'financial dangers' " to the "more subtle 
hazards"52 inherent in mixing the two lines of business. The exten-
sive delineation of these hazards in Camp provides a comprehensive 
framework for evaluating the legality of bank discount brokerage 
operations. 53 
A. Promotional Pressures of Investment Banking 
Congress believed that the "aggressive and promotional charac-
ter of the investment banking business"54 would create unfortunate 
"temptation[st55 for commercial bankers. These temptations could 
take several forms. A bank selling particular securities would have a 
"salesman's interest"56 in promoting those securities, an interest in-
compatible with impartial evaluation of credit risks. Alternatively, 
the bank affiliate's interest in particular securities might distort credit 
decisions, causing the bank to make imprudent loans to "companies 
in whose stock or securities the affiliate ha[d] invested or otherwise 
become involved."57 Finally, a bank with promotional concerns 
the legislative history, this Note will analyze the issue by examining the policies of Glass-
Steagall. Because discount brokerage did not exist until 50 years after the passage of the Act, 
the vague legislative history is not a reliable indicator of congressional approval or disapproval 
of bank discount brokerage operations. 
50. 401 U.S. 617 (1971). In this case, the Court struck down the Comptroller's approval of 
bank management of mutual investment funds. 
51. See 401 U.S. at 630-34, 636-38. 
52. 401 U.S. at 630. 
53. Cf. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091, 1099-1100 (D.D.C. 1975) 
(court uses Camp analysis to evaluate legality of bank service), vacated as not ripe far decision 
sub nom. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
435 U.S. 942 (1978). 
54. 401 U.S. at 632 (footnote omitted). 
55. 401 U.S. at 631. 
56. 401 U.S. at 631; see Note, supra note 45, at 104-05. 
57. 401 U.S. at 63l;seealso 15 CONG. REc. 9912 (1932) (statement of Sen. Bulkley); Note, 
supra note 45, at 104-05. 
The theoretical validity of this unsound loan proposition is not obvious. If an affiliate were 
holding worthless securities, a bank would face two options. First, it could let the issuing 
company flounder without an extension of credit. The bank's affiliate would suffer a loss, but 
the bank would presumably be insulated by separate incorporation. The loss to its affiliate 
would reflect on the bank only to the extent of the closeness of association in the public mind. 
The bank's second option would be to extend credit to the troubled company to avert the 
loss to its affililate. This raises the immediate possibility that a bank would have to loan more 
than the value of the securities held by its affiliate in order to help the troubled company, or 
that the loan would be in addition to the securities, thereby increasing the total exposure of the 
bank-affiliate entity. Even in a more restricted case, where the bank loan would somehow pay 
off the affiliate's securities, the risk and loss would be transferred directly within the bank, 
which would thereby lose its limited liability and the public relations advantages of separate 
incorporation. That a bank would choose the second option over the first appears irrational. 
A further point is that the theory almost necessarily assumes that the loan will go bad. If 
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would face conflicts of int~rest; it might protect its own investments 
at a customer's expense.58 
The concerns that motivated congressional enactment of Glass-
Steagall are not relevant to a bank discount brokerage operation. 
All of them are related to "the investment banker's pecuniary stake 
in the success of particular investment opportunities"59 and thus per-
tain only to the dealing and underwriting functions of investment 
banking. Discount brokers neither sell nor have a financial interest 
in particular securities. Thus, they have neither direct investments to 
protect nor a salesman's promotional interest in the securities.60 At 
most, a bank might be tempted to make unsound loans to companies 
in which brokerage customers had invested.61 However, a bank 
probably would not make risky loans solely to prevent losses to cus-
tomers, especially where the bank brokerage service did not promote 
the stock. 62 
However, the discount brokerage business, and particularly bank 
discount brokerage, might produce two of the promotional pressures 
that motivated Congress to pass Glass-Steagall. First, while brokers 
feel no pressure to sell a specific investment, "[a]ny discount busi-
ness. . . depends on generating a large volume of sales."63 The cost 
the loan is not "unsound," but instead would help the troubled company on its way, then the 
second option would be preferable, but the supposed evil of the system would not exist, 
58. 401 U.S. at 633. One Senator stated: 
Obviously, the banker who has nothing to sell to his depositors is much better qualified to 
advise disinterestedly and to regard diligently the safety of depositors than the banker 
who uses the list of depositors in his savings department to distribute circulars concerning 
the advantages of this, that, or the other investment on which the bank is to receive an 
originating profit or an underwriting profit or a distribution profit or a trading profit or 
any combination of such profits. 
75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1932) (statement of Sen. Bukley). 
59. 401 U.S. at 634; see also 401 U.S. at 631. 
60. See Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 116. Discount brokerage services do not 
generate pressure to unload worthless securities on customers, nor would the bank have an 
opportunity to profit through a differential in selling and buying prices. The profit stems solely 
from the commissions on buying and selling. See text at notes 63-67 in.fro. 
61. One might argue that a bank may make loans to corporations in which its brokerage 
customers had invested in order to boost the market value of the stock and thereby attract new 
customers. The potential for abuse arising from this conflict would seem to be minimal since it 
is highly unlikely that a bank would risk making unsound loans solely for the comparatively 
insignificant increment in revenues from new brokerage customers. Luse & Olson, supra note 
12, at 22, col. 3; note 57 supra. 
62. Should banks limit their brokerage transactions to agency transactions, they would 
avoid promotional activity in the same way as do discount brokers. See notes 3-5 supra and 
accompanying text. 
63. Behind the shakeout in discount brokering, supra note 3, at 47. 
Brokerage fees are usually determined as a percentage of the value of each transaction, 
(frequently with a minimum or maximum also}, so quantity and amount would be positively 
correlated to the income. See s. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 306-25 
(1977) (description of commissions with analysis of rules designed to curb this volume 
incentive). 
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of maintaining a large-scale discount brokerage business64 could add 
to the pressure. The need for volume might tempt banks to extend 
credit through margin loans in order to facilitate securities 
purchases.65 Although a bank's ability to make margin loans raises 
issues of competitive fairness and investor protection, 66 such loans 
do not threaten the interests of depositors.67 Two separate regula-
tory authorities already police "margin" loans. Under authority of 
the securities laws, the Federal Reserve Board controls margin 
purchases of stock and securities.68 In addition, although the Comp-
troller of the Currency does not directly regulate bank loans, it 
closely examines the lending practices of banks. 69 If the practices 
64. See Angermueller, supra note 47, at 135 ("Commerical banks have discovered, as 
securities firms have learned before them, that the cost of maintaining a large-scale retail bro-
kerage operation is heavy."; Behind the shakeout in discount brokering, supra note 3, at 47. See 
also Security Pac!fic Application, supra note 7, at 86,256 (subsidiary eventually intends to offer 
services at non-branch locations inside and outside California and may also seek membership 
on one or more national securities exchanges); Wriggling through the loopholes, supra note 2 
("Bank of America . . . will end up owning a membership on several stock exchanges through 
Schwab .... "). 
65. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,632 (1971); S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 
1st Sess., 9-10. This concern would be more acute for discount brokers than for traditional 
brokers because of the heightened need for volume in discount brokerage. 
66. See notes 160-72 infra and accompanying text. 
67. In fact, several commentators have asserted that concerns about unwise extension of 
credit are not significant at all. See Luse & Olson, supra note 12, at 22, col. 3 ("[l]t is unlikely 
that for the sake of commissions, banks would make unsound loans to individuals in order to 
induce them to purchase securities through the bank."); Note, Bank-Sponsored Investment 
Services: Statutory Proscriptions, Jurisdictional Col!/licts, and a Legislative Proposal, 21 U. FLA. 
L. REV. 776, 793 (1975) (a "modest service fee ... [is] hardly the incentive to accept poor 
credit risks.") Yet in some situations, this concern is not unrealistic. For example, in a rising 
stock market, banks may become overly optimistic and lose sight of the transitory value of 
their collateral. Loans that seemed solid might become questionable if the market turns. Cf. 
Ingrassia, Failure of Two Small Missouri Banks 'Jyp!fies Troubles Behind Closings, Wall St. J., 
Mar. 24, 1983, at 29, col. 6 ("poor economic conditions make good loans turn bad"). In addi-
tion, banks might try promotional gimmicks, such as low-interest loans, to attract publicity and 
consumer interest at the start-up of a discount brokerage business. See, e.g., Salamon, Money 
Funds, Proliferating as Assets Fall, Wall St. J., March 11, 1983, at 21, col. 3 (banks paying high 
interest rates to lure new money market customers). 
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976); see generally 12 C.F.R. §§ 221 (1982) (Regulation U -
bank margin restrictions); 220 (1982) (Regulation T - broker margin restrictions); and 207 
(1982) (Regulation G - margin restrictions for other lenders). 
Banks are currently subject to virtually the same major limits as brokers. While the regula-
tions for brokers are more detailed, many important regulations are the same for both banks 
and brokers. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.8(a)(l) (1982) (maximum loan value of margin equity 
security in a general account is 50% of current market value); 220.8(e) (1982) retention require-
ment of margin security is 70% of current market value); and 220.8(f) (1982) ("(N]o put, call, or 
combination thereof shall have loan value."). Two possibly significant differences in coverage 
are that the bank margin regulations apply only to stock loans, see 12 C.F.R. §§ 221.l(a)(l), 
.3(1) (1982), and have a "purpose" requirement. See 12 C.F.R. § 221.l(a)(l), .3(b) (1982). 
Presumably the differences reflect the fact that the banks engage in all sorts ofloan-financing, 
while brokers do not. See note 162 infra. Ultimately, if the Federal Reserve becomes con-
cerned with a rise in margin loans, it can tighten these limits as it has often done in the past. 
See 2 L. Loss, supra note 7, at 1244-48 (description of past changes in margin restrictions). 
69. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 4.11 (1982). 
1516 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:1498 
are questionable or risky, "examiners may be permanently stationed 
at the bank to supervise its day-to-day activities, or the Comptroller 
may require the more serious remedies of additional capital or a 
change in bank management."70 These bank examinations directly 
police the ·problem of unsound margin loans and protect depositors 
by assuring that unsound loans do not affect the solvency ofbanks.71 
In short, existing regulatory mechanisms will probably discourage 
banks from unwisely extending credit to facilitate volume securities 
purchases. However, to the degree that those regulations fail to pro-
vide as much protection as securities law, and therefore give banks 
an unfair advantage over traditional brokers, banks should be re-
quired to incorporate separately their discount brokerage services. 
This requirement would bring the services within the ambit of the 
securities regulations. 72 
The second concern specific to bank discount brokerage lies in 
the risk that promotional pressure will produce a conflict of interest 
by preventing the commercial banker from rendering disinterested 
investment advice.73 Although this problem again appears most 
forcefully where a bank has "a particular investment to sell,"74 bank 
discount brokers might be more open to this charge than nonbank 
discount brokers. Banks are currently permitted to buy and sell 
some types of securities as principals,75 and their trust departments 
70. Note, The Legality of Bank-Sponsored Investment Services, 84 YALE L.J. 1477, 1498 
(1975) (footnote omitted); cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1976); 12 C.F.R. Part 19 (1982) (discussing 
various remedies, including termination of bank's insured status; cease and desist orders for 
unsafe practices; and removal of officers). Where the Comptroller has found problems, he has 
not hesitatt;d to arrange involuntary mergers with other banks. See, e.g., Ingrassia, supra note 
67 (regulators classified loans as problems, required additional capital for the banks, and even-
tually declared the banks insolvent). 
71. See Lybecker.Regulation of Trust f}epartment Investment Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 977, 
978 (1973) (examinations "assure bank depositors of the bank's continuing solvency"); Note, 
supra note 70, at 1498. 
72. See notes 160-95 in.fra and accompanying text. 
73. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 633 (1971). 
74. Camp, 401 U.S. at 636. The Court stated: 
A bank that operates an investment fund has a particular investment to sell. It is not a 
matter of indifference to the bank whether the customer buys an interest in the fund or 
makes some other investment. If its customers cannot be persuaded to invest in the bank's 
investment fund, the bank will lose their investment business and the fee which that busi-
ness would have brought in. 
401 U.S. at 636. In discount brokerage, a bank would have no particular investment to sell 
and would be indifferent as to which security a customer selects. As long as the customer 
makes some purchase or sale transaction, the bank will make its commission. 
The Court noted two types of conflicts. The first is "between the promotional interest of 
the investment banker and the obligation of the commerical banker to render disinterested 
investment advice." 401 U.S. at 633. The second is where "security affiliates ... unload 
excessive holdings through the trust department of the sponsor bank." 401 U.S. at 633 (foot-
note omitted). Neither of these conflicts would exist where the broker neither promotes nor 
owns any stock. 
75. See 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (primarily government securities); see note 15 supra. 
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regularly buy and sell most kinds of securities.76 Adding a discount 
brokerage operation would arguably give a bank further opportuni-
ties to manipulate transactions. 77 These potential conflicts, however, 
are already regulated. Trust departments are held to high standards 
of accountability.78 Similarly, the anti-fraud provisions of the secur-
ities laws,79 the common law,80 and bank regulations81 all police the 
manipulation of bank brokerage and dealing transactions. 82 Given 
that these safeguards protect against the potential for manipulation 
between trust accounts and bank-owned securities, 83 they are ade-
16. See Hunsicker, Co'!flicts of Interest, Economic .Distortions, and the Separation of Trust 
and Commercial Banking Functions, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 611, 613 (1977) ("Bank trust depart-
ments currently handle approximately $400 billion of other people's money and are by far the 
dominant class of institutional investors in an economy increasingly dominated by institu-
tional investors." (footnotes omitted)). 
77. The potential for manipulation would lie in the pricing of transactions. If, for exam-
ple, a brokerage customer place a "market order,'' an order to buy or sell at the best price 
available, see K. GARBADE, SECURITIES MARKETS 447 (1982), the bank might sell one of its 
own securities at a higher-than-market price, or buy the customer's security at a lower-than-
market price. If the customer placed a "limit order," specifying the price he would buy or sell 
at, see id., no such opportunity would exist. The potential for manipulation between trust 
accounts and brokerage clients seems less severe. The bank might, by systematically favoring 
trust accounts, get higher management fees while still receiving brokerage commissions. Since 
more money is involved in trust funds, see note 76 supra, and the bank's reputation and re-
wards are more directly related to trust performance, banks would have an incentive to favor 
trusts in transactions. See generally Herman, Commerical Bank Trust .Departments, in ABUSE 
ON WALL STREET 23, 80-92 (Twentieth Century Fund Report 1980). However, the relatively 
sophisticated investor who uses a discount brokerage service, see Federal Reserve Board, supra 
note 3, at 113, would probably recognize a consistent discrepancy in price. 
78. As a fiduciary, the trustee is subject to the 'prudent-man rule' in the administration 
of the trust. This rule requires that the trustee make such investments as a prudent man 
would make with his own property, having primarily the view of preservation of the estate 
and the production of a resonable amount of income. Some courts have held that a bank 
trust department is under an even higher standard of skill and prudence than other trust-
ees since banks have or at least hold themselves out as having greater skill in investments 
than a layman has. 
J. WHITE, supra note 46, at 512; see generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 92a(c)-(h) & 481 (1976); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 9 (1982). 
Current regulations apparently prevent a bank from selling trust account securities at 
prices favorable to brokerage customers. Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 9.12(d) (1982) (bank may sell assets 
from one fiduciary account to another if the transaction is fair to both accounts). 
19. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78j (1976). 
SO. See generally Mayer, Broker-.Dealer Firms, in ABUSE ON WALL STREET (Twentieth 
Century Fund Report 1980) (examining "the scope of the broker-dealer's fiduciary 
obligations"). 
81. 12 C.F.R. § 12.6(b) (1982) requires banks to allocate securities and prices equitably 
when orders are received at the same time, and 12 C.F.R. § 12.6(c} (1982) permits cross-selling 
among accounts only where permissible under local law and "on a fair and equitable basis." 
This regulation was promulgated under the Comptroller's authority to regulate bank securities 
activities. See 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1976). 
82. A bank manipulating market orders from brokerage customers would certainly be in 
violatjon of bank regulations, see note 81 supra, and would not be executing the transaction at 
"the best price available." 
83. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,633 (1971), where the Court observed 
that 
Congress had before it evidence that security affiliates might be driven to unload excessive 
holdings through the trust department of the sponsor bank. Some witnesses at the hear-
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quate to prevent the more limited problem present when banks en-
gage in brokerage activities. 84 
B. Public Confidence in the Banking System 
Another concern of Glass-Steagall is that the actual or perceived 
association of banks with risky securities markets would cause a loss 
of confidence in the banking system. 85 Banks could not involve 
themselves with "selling particular stocks and securities" without 
their "[prudent] reputation being undercut by the risks necessarily 
incident to the investment banking business."86 Specifically, a bank 
believing that a troubled securities affiliate could impair public con-
fidence in the bank might feel compelled "to shore up the affiliate 
through unsound loans or other aid."87 Alternatively, customers dis-
satisfied with their purchases88 or with the execution and price of an 
ings expressed the view that this practice constituted self-dealing in violation of the 
trustee's obligation of loyalty, and indeed that it would be improper for a bank's trust 
department to purchase anything from the bank's securities affiliate. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
84. As several commentators have noted, potential conflicts of interest are always present 
when an agent acts for more than one principal. See BanksAIS,supra note 31, at 81,362; Luse 
& Olson,supra note 12, at 22, col. 4; Note;supra note 70, at 1493-94. Thus, the mere possibil-
ity of conflict should not always lead to prohibition. Indeed, in the securities industry, a bro-
ker-dealer acting as both agent and principal necessarily faces conflicts. After a thorough 
study of the situation the Securities and Exchange Commission recommended regulation of 
broker-dealers rather than a blanket prohibition of the dual function. SEC, REPORT ON THE 
FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF 
DEALER AND BROKER 109-14 (1936); cf. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15b10-3, 240.15cl-7 (1982) (suitabil-
ity and anti-churning rules). Similarly, regulation will adequately control potential abuse of 
discount brokerage services. 
85. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,632 (1911);see Note,supra note 45, at 106-
07. A ·measure that seems at least partially aimed at avoiding even the appearance of impro-
priety or riskiness is the prohibition on bank sales oflottery tickets. See 12 U.S.C. § 25a (1976), 
86. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. at 632 (footnote omitted). Note the court's 
reference to sale of "particular stocks and securities" ( emphasis added), a feature not present in 
bank discount brokerage services. See also Clark & Saunders, supra note 16, at 834. 
87. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp., 401 U.S. at 631. 
By definition, the argument would only apply in a holding company or other affiliate con-
text, and the major affiliate proposals to date contemplate national operations. See BankAmer-
ica Application, supra note 2, at 85,962; Security Pac!ftc Application, supra note 7, at 86,255. 
One wonders whether the far-flung brokerage operations would be so closely associated as to 
impair confidence in the bank should the affiliate fare badly. This question is ultimately an 
empirical matter, which has so far been subject to more conjecture than study. A further 
weakness of the argument in the holding company context is that regulations could be 
designed to prevent most of the public association between the two entities, ef. 12 C.F.R, 
§ 225.125 (1982) (bank holding company may not have name similar to or share offices with an 
investment company that the holding company advises), although such regulations might miti-
gate the expected convenience of a one-stop financial center. 
88. [A]lthough such a [trading] loss would possibly not result in any substantial impair-
ment of the resources of the banking institution owning that affiliate • • • there can be no 
doubt that the whole transaction tends to discredit the bank and impair the confidence of 
its depositors. 
75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1932) (statement of Sen. Bulkley.) Note the definitional trap that this 
argument sets for bankers. If they do not make loans to assist companies whose securities their 
customers have purchased from the banks' affiliates, then the customers will blame the banks 
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order,89 might have less confidence in the bank. 
In fact, the fear that bank discount brokerage services might 
damage the staid image of banking is unfounded. Discount broker-
age services place relatively little bank capital at risk90 and present 
no speculative traps that would reflect on the banks' management 
ability.91 Given that depositors are insured,92 the slight increase in 
banks' exposure to loss should not affect public opinion on the riski-
ness of banking. Just as the hazards of the housing industry do not 
reflect upon a bank when it offers automatically to deduct mortgage 
payments, the risks of the stock market should not impair a bank's 
reputation when it offers brokerage services to customers.93 In both 
cases, customers should realize that the bank is merely performing a 
low-cost clerical transaction. 
Concerns about consumer dissatisfaction with discount broker-
age services also do not withstand analysis. The risk that bank loans 
to affiliates will undermine public confidence is minimal because 
for their losses. If they do make such loans, then they will suffer direct losses and public 
confidence 'in them will diminish. The argument fails to admit that customers may not blame 
banks for the customers' own losses; that loans may be beneficial and sound; or that customers 
who close a good deal may increase their confidence in banks. 
89. This concern would apply to "market orders," in which the customer tells the broker to 
buy or sell at the best price available at the time of the order. See note 77 supra. Limit orders, 
which direct that the security be bought or sold when it reaches a certain price, see note 77 
supra, would generally preclude a customer from blaming the bank for errors of price and 
execution. 
90. See Spencer, Rationale of Current Regulatory Approaches to Banks' Securities Activities, 
in SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF COMMERICAL BANKS 35, 40 (A. Sametz ed. 1981) ("Bank bro-
kerage activities such as . . • customer transaction services tie up very little bank capital be-
cause the banks act as agents rather than as principals in the activity."); cf. Osborn, What 
happenstifter Glass-Steagall? 16 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1982, at 67, 68 (banks' capital 
is very large relative to traditional broker-dealer firms). 
To a large extent, banks now provide the capital for much of the nation's securities busi-
ness. "(S]ecurities firms borrow between $5 and $6 billion from banks" every day, Osborn, 
supra, at 70, and as of August, 1982, co=ercial banks in the U.S. held $237.l billion ofnon-
Treasury securities and had $21.4 billion outstanding in security loans (seasonally adjusted 
figures). See 68 FED. REsERVE BULL. Al5 (Oct. 1982). Dissemination of accurate information 
about current bank involvement in securities, and the marginal increase in involvement that 
could result from discount brokerage services, would probably dispel any incipient public con-
fidence problem. 
91. See Clark & Saunders, supra note 16, at 834. 
92. Deposit accounts are insured by a federal agency. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 371a, 
371b, & 1811-32 (1976). In the past, fixed interest rates have been a further stablizing force. In 
1980, however, Congress transferred the power to set rates, see 12 U.S.C. §§ 371b, 1456(a), & 
1828(g), to a newly formed Depository Institutions Deregulatory Committee. The Committee 
was directed "to provide for the orderly phase-out and the ultimate elimination [by March 31, 
1986] of the limitations on the maximum rates of interest and dividends which may be paid on 
deposits and accounts .... " Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 204(a), 94 Stat. 132, 143; see generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-09 
(Supp. V 1981). 
93. CJ. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091, 1099 (D.D.C. 1975) (court 
analogized a more limited bank brokerage plan as a sale of services similar to the deduction of 
mortgage payments), vacated as not ripe for decision sub nom. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. 
Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978). 
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both Glass-Steagall94 and the Bank Holding Company Act95 exten-
sively regulate such loans.96 
Furthermore, discount brokerage poses no threat to customer sat-
isfaction because where brokers do not promote stocks or render ad-
vice, losses to the customer do not reflect on the bank at all.97 Even 
if bank discount brokerage operations did produce customer dissatis-
faction with the specific services provided, they would not threaten 
94. See Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 13, 48 Stat. 162, 183 (current version at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 371c (1976) (applying to all member banks of the Federal Reserve system); see also 12 
C.F.R. §§ 7.7360-.7370, 250.240, 250.250 (1983) (giving situations where § 371c applies). 
95. See Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 12(c), 80 Stat. 236, 242 (current version 
at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(i)(I) (Supp. IV 1980)) (applying to banks covered by Federal Deposit 
Insurance who are not members of the Federal Reserve System). 
In addition to these direct safeguards, bank regulators have extensive authority to examine 
affiliates to ensure that their activities do not, by act or implication, threaten the solvency of 
the bank. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 16l(c), 481, 1817(a), 1844(c) (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 7.7376(d) 
(1983). 
96. The possibility of unsound loans is a problem co=on to all affiliates - an affiliate in 
any line of business may fare badly. The argument seems to have arisen in the context of bank 
securities activities because securities affiliates fared badly prior to 1933; thus, experience im-
plies that a full-scale securities business is particularly risky. Even without statutory regulation 
of bank loans to affiliates, discount brokerage affiliates are not as risky. First, the securities 
business generally is better regulated than in the 1920s. See notes 149-52, 156, 159-61 i'!fra 
and accompanying text. Second, the major element of risk-investment of the affiliate's capital 
directly in securities - is absent from discount brokerage operations. 
The fear that the public will lose confidence in banks has not stopped the recent trend 
toward holding company and affiliate organization. Indeed, the Treasury Department has re-
cently proposed to require that in some cases bank securities activities be conducted by a non-
bank affiliate. See text at notes 173-95 i'!fra. See generally Securities Activities of Depository 
lnslilulions: Hearings on S. 1720 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-10 & 15-17 (1982) (statement of 
Donald Regan, Secretary of the Treasury). 
97. See Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 116; Clark & Saunders, supra note 16, at 
832. The fact that banks would not promote any particular security is a sufficient answer to the 
observation that Congress intended Glass-Steagall to overcome fears "that the promotional 
needs of investment banking might lead co=erical banks to lend their reputation for pru-
dence and restraint to the enterprise of sellingparlicular stocks and securities, and that this 
could not be done without the reputation being undercut by the risks necessarily incident to 
the investment banking business." Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 632 (1971) 
(emphasis added); see also notes 86-89 supra. 
The argument that banks will make unsound loans to affiliates, see note 87 supra and 
accompanying text, assumes that public perception of guilt by association would force the 
bank to prop up the struggling affiliate. But in the case of discount brokerage services, the 
association is between the bank and an unrelated company in which a customer has invested. 
Where the customer does not rely on the discount broker in choosing the stock, the association 
is extremely tenuous. 
In some areas, the association argument has some weight. According to the regulations on 
bank holding company (BHC) investment adviser activities, the BHC cannot advise "an in-
vestment company which has a name that is similar to, or a variation of, the name of the 
holding company or any of its subsidiary banks." 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(1) (1982). The regula-
tions state the concern more explicitly with regard to offices: "[A BHC] should not act as 
investment advisor to a mutual fund which has offices in any building which is likely to be 
identified in the public's mind with the bank holding company." 12 C.F.R. §225.125(h) (1982). 
The goal of these regulations apparently is to make the mutual fund appear unrelated to the 
bank, while in the case of a company whose stock is sold by a bank discount broker, the 
appearance flows naturally from the foci of unrelatedness. 
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the stability of the banking system.98Customers upset over the price 
or efficiency of a transaction need only switch to another broker -
bank-owned or otherwise.99 If their disenchantment is so great that 
they also wish to withdraw their deposits from the bank, 100 they are 
likely only to switch to another bank.101 Glass-Steagall should not 
be construed to protect the possible poor reputation of a few ineffi-
cient banks when the integrity of the banking system itself is not 
threatened.102 
C. .Diversion of Resources 
Bank discount brokerage services might cause a bank "[to] divert 
talent and resources from its commercial banking operation[ s ]" 103 to 
98. The notion that dissatisfaction with particular services would undermine the banking 
system simply proves too much; perhaps banks should not act at all, lest they act poorly and 
offend some customer upon whose goodwill they depend. Waiting in teller lines may be the 
most frequently criticized aspect of banking, but no one suggests that banks should abolish 
teller services. Banks sometimes make bad loans, and spectacular incidents like the failure of 
Penn Central, Franklin National Bank, and Penn Square may impair public confidence in the 
banking system, but no one has seriously suggested that banks should stop making commercial 
loans. If the service is necessary and/or beneficial, the remedy for occasional problems is to 
improve the system, rather than abolish it 
99. The anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts have been interpreted to incorporate the 
trade custom that all transactions will be consummated promptly unless otherwise agreed. See 
E. Weiss, supra note 2, at 181. Though banks are generally exempt from the securities laws, 
see note 141 infra, they are subject to the anti-fraud provisions. See text at note 79 supra. 
Thus, the "prompt execution" doctrine would apply to bank discount brokers, and regulations 
currently exist to facilitate such a rule. See 12 C.F.R. § 12.3(c) (1983) (banks required to keep 
time records for customer securities transactions). In the unlikely event that banks are not 
required to execute orders promptly and that all banks execute orders slowly, a dissatisfied 
customer could at least switch to a nonbank broker, who would be held to a duty of prompt 
execution. 
100. This argument assumes that the customer has some nonbrokerage relationship with 
the bank, but if the conclusion of this Note is adopted, that would not necessarily be the case. 
101. Banks still have a virtual monopoly on transaction balances, so there are few other 
places that a disgruntled customer could go with his money. For example, in October of 1980, 
M-lA (demand deposits in commercial banks plus cash) totaled $386.7 billion, and that figure 
only increased by $24.1 billion when NOW accounts at banks, thrifts, and credit unions were 
added (seasonally adjusted figures). See 66 FED. R.EsERVE BULL. A13 (Dec. 1980). Even if the 
funds were placed in a cash management account or money market fund, they would not be 
wholly withdrawn from the financial markets. Again, this question is subject to empirical 
proof, but most individuals probably would not withdraw their deposits from a bank and hide 
them under a mattress merely because the bank was slow in executing a securities transaction. 
102. Naturally, the banking laws should not encourage any practices that would signifi-
cantly increase the risk of failure, even for only a handful of banks. But our economic system 
is generally founded on a desire to reward the efficient over the inefficient, and this reward, not 
an increase in risks, is the likely result of the customer dissatisfaction argument in the bank 
discount brokerage context 
103. Investment Co. Inst v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 638 (1971); see Clark & Saunders, supra 
note 16, at 828,835. The Court in Camp expressed this concern in the context of promotion of 
an open-ended mutual fund, but the point applies as well to discount brokerage services. A 
bank might share computer facilities or managerial effort with its brokerage operation. See 
Weinstein, Banks Get Into Brokerage Business-Chemical Bank Tests the Water, 116 TR. & 
EsT. 31 (1977); S&L Brokerage Proposal, supra note·8 at 61,022-23. · 
An analogous problem is the "obvious danger that a bank might invest its own assets in 
1522 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 81:1498 
securities activities. The upper management of a bank would be oc-
cupied by brokerage concerns where it had not been in the past. 
New offices might be opened, staff added, and advertising campaigns 
launched. This argument, however, assumes that the pool of skilled 
banking talent is limited and does not explain why banks would not 
hire from among experienced brokerage personnel instead of divert-
ing bank management. 104 If the new operation is profitable, the 
bank is strengthened by the slight diversion of resources incurred in 
the start-up.105 If the brokerage business is not profitable, a bank 
presumably will not suffer losses indefinitely but will terminate the 
operation.106 Any needed diversion of bank resources to discount 
brokerage services would have a limited duration and would not 
threaten the bank's solvency. 
frozen or otherwise imprudent stock or security investments." 401 U.S. at 630. Though dis-
count brokers will not make direct investments in stock or security, see note 6 supra and ac-
companying text, one could read this "obvious danger'' more broadly as a concern for bank 
liquidity. Large investments in fixed assets such as new offices, data processing equipment, 
and stock exchange seats, see note 64 supra, would implicate this concern. 
This liquidity problem is not significant. First, direct or indirect investment in bank prem-
ises, by the bank or by an affiliate, is already limited to the amount of a bank's capital stock. 
See 12 U.S.C. § 371d (1976). Congress has handled the fixed assets problem to the extent it 
thought necessary. Second, many banks already possess large data processing facilities. Dis-
count brokerage might provide an opportunity to use this equipment more efficiently, espe-
cially because banks and thrift institutions are spending millions to develop electronic 
transaction capabilities to eliminate the cost of paper transactions. The same system could 
eventually handle securities transactions as well, further reducing the operational costs of retail 
brokerage and passing along some of these economies to investor in the form of lower broker-
age rates. Angermueller, supra note 47, at 135; cf. Branson, supra note 1, at 900-01 ("Savings 
also result since many banks have in-house computer facilities, allowing off-hours computer 
time use for processing the paperwork [automatic investment service] plans generate,"), 
104. Some smaller savings and loan associations have proposed to hire experienced bro-
kerage personnel for their discount brokerage operations. See Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board General Counsel, Stock Brokerage Activities for Existing, Acquired or Newly Established 
Service Corporations, [Current] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,013, at 61,031-32 (March 
3, 1983) (hereinafter cited as FHLBB General Counsel]. Where banks acquire an existing 
discount brokerage firm, they are, of course, hiring out of the existing pool. Several banks 
have used this approach, see Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 105; Carrington, supra 
note 1. 
105. In approving an application for a bank discount brokerage operation, the Federal 
Reserve Board noted that "[d]espite fluctuations in earnings, discount brokers in general, and 
[the broker being acquired] in particular, have been profitable .... [The discount broker] is 
not a speculative enterprise .... " Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 113. The growth 
in commissions and market share of discount brokers, see Carrington, supra note 1, also indi-
cates that discount brokers seem to be doing well. 
106. Banks in the recent past have not hesitated to terminate unprofitable brokerage opera-
tions. Approximately thirty major banks offered automatic investment services in the mid-
1970s, but "no one made any money at it .... " Weinstein, supra note 103, at 32 (quoting 
Roger Kline, a consultant with an investment firm). By 1976, only 18 banks still offered the 
service, and some of these later ended their involvement. See Spencer, Regulation of Bank 
Securities Activities: The Effects of the SEC Bank Study, 95 BANK.ING L.J. 616, 618 (1978). 
Similarly, when Chemical Bank's more expansive brokerage service in the late-1970s failed to 
tum a profit, the Bank ended it within a year. See Clark & Saunders, supra note 16, at 829-30. 
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D. Centralization of Banking Functions 
Although Congress did not intend the Act to do so, Glass-Stea-
gall currently serves to decentralize capital formation and invest-
ment decisionmaking. 107 The securities industry has argued that 
discount brokerage services undermine this function because banks 
would have an unfair competitive advantage over the brokers. 
First, according to this argument, banks could scan their deposit 
records to solicit prospective brokerage customers. 108 But even if 
banks used their depositor lists to attract customers, they might not 
obtain new investors because established brokerage firms thoroughly 
cover existing sources of capital.109 In fact, brokers would have an 
advantage in the resulting marketing battle, because they would 
have access to relevant information concerning customers' past bro-
kerage transactions. Moreover, brokers would have an opportunity 
to win new customers away from the banks. By resisting these 
changes, the securities industry apparently fears not only unfair 
competition, but any competition at all. 110 
Second, full service brokers argue that bank discount brokerage 
services would profit unfairly from access to cheaper funds. 111 Such 
access results fr<?m a bank's structural position as a depository insti-
tution.112 Federal deposit insurance and interest rate ceilings also 
assure the availability of low-cost funds by making consumer bank 
accounts riskless and relatively inexpensive. 113 These apparent ad-
vantages do not, however, permit banks to profit unfairly. Banks 
bear part of the cost of assuring available funds by paying deposit 
insurance, 114 and securities firms receive similar protection from the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation.115 In addition, interest 
rate ceilings are now being phased out and will be eliminated in 
1986.116 Ultimately, the asserted advantages of access to low-cost 
funds do not seem to carry over into bank profitability and ability to 
107. Taylor, Commerical vs. investment bankers: The Case Against, 55 HARV. Bus. REV., 
Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 138, 144; Note, supra note 45, at 108-09. 
108. See Securities Indus. Assn., Bank Securities Activities: Memorandum far Study and 
Discussion, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 751, 782 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Securities Indus. 
Assn.]; 75 Cong. Rec. 9912 (1932) (statement of Sen. Bukley). 
109. See Taylor, supra note 107, at 141. 
110. Cf. Carrington, supra note 1 (brokers, already cutting rates because of discount com-
petition, think discounters will become more important if banks enter the market). 
111. See Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 111-12. 
112. See Securities Indus. Assn., supra note 108, at 777-80; see also Osborn, supra note 90, 
at 70 (broker loans from banks are higher than bank cost of funds). 
113. Securities Indus. Assn., supra note 108, at 777; Taylor, supra note 107, at 140. 
114. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (1976); Angermueller, supra note 47, at 137; Wall St. J., Mar. 
28, 1983, at 10, col. 1. 
115. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aa-78lll (1976); Angermueller, supra note 47, at 137; 
Note, supra note 70, at 1499-1500. 
116. See note 92 supra. 
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attract capital.117 
Claims about cross-subsidization and voluntary tying118 are simi-
larly unpersuasive. These arguments amount to nothing more than a 
concern that consumers will handle all of their financial transactions 
in one place, a bank. Both claims assume conditions of product scar-
city or market dominance that do not exist in the banking busi-
ness.119 The voluntary tying argument assumes that consumers will 
patronize bank brokers in the hope of getting credit from the 
bank.120 However, the possibility of tying is remote because credit is 
not scarce.121 Similarly, cross-subsidization only occurs where a 
company with one product line "has sufficient market dominance [in 
another product line] to be able to eliminate competitors by sus-
tained below-cost pricing."122 Considering that discount brokers 
have an 8.4% share of retail brokerage commissions, 123 that discount 
brokerage as a business has low barriers to entry, 124 and that more 
companies, including relatively small corporations, are in fact enter-
ing the business, 125 market dominance in discount brokerage is an 
unlikely prospect. Thus, the only probable result of a bank's attempt 
to subsidize discount brokerage is a loss for the operation. 126 
The securities industry also complains that tax advantages en-
joyed by banks make competition unfair. 127 However, these tax ad-
vantages concern other bank securities activities, such as municipal 
securities dealing.128 If the discount brokerage service itself is not 
117. See, e.g., Osborn, supra note 90, at 69 (large banks earned 13% return on equity for 
the year ending September, 1981, while "Wall Street Houses" averaged 22% during the same 
period); Federal Reserve Board,supra note 3, at 111 ("[T]he rate paid by [BankAmerica Corp,] 
on its co=ercial paper during May through July 1982 were generally the same or higher than 
rates on co=ercial paper paid by corporations of similar size and credit ratings."), 
118. See Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 112; Securities Indus. Assn., supra note 
108, at 782-83; Note, supra note 14, at 108-09. 
119. Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 112. 
120. Note, supra note 45, at 108-09. 
121. Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 112; Angermueller, supra note 47, at 134 
(those who seek capital "cross freely from turf to turf looking for the best available and most 
economic service."); id. at 136 (corporations switch from bank to bank, are not "captive 
clients"). 
122. Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 112. 
123. See note I supra. 
124. See Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 112. 
125. See FHLBB General Counsel, supra note 104 (five savings and loan associations and 
a federal savings bank each setting up a discount brokerage operation). 
126. The paradigm case for both cross-subsidization and voluntary tying would occur 
where a huge banking firm acquires a large discount broker, as BankAmerica has done. How-
ever, in a careful analysis, the Federal Reserve Board found these concerns unjustified, Fed-
eral Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 112. If, in this situation, credit is not a scarce product and 
the prospects for market dominance in retail brokerage are slim, the probability that the tying 
and cross-subsidization will ever materialize is low. 
127. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Assn., supra note 108, at 777-78, 
128. Id.; Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 112. 
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subsidized, these ·limited tax advantages will not affect the competi-
tion between bank discount brokers and others for the retail broker-
age business. 
The securities industry contends that the advantages that banks 
allegedly possess in offering discount brokerage services will exacer-
bate the existing concentration of financial power in the hands of 
bankers, 129 thus undermining the decentralization effect of Glass-
Steagall.130 This argument assumes that major banks will dominate, 
or at least succeed in, the discount brokerage business. Even if 
banks did dominate, their influence would not produce a centraliza-
tion of financial decisionmaking that amounted to "control of the 
allocation of business capital in our economy."131 Discount broker-
age by definition involves no decisionmaking by the broker, 132 so 
banks would have no more power to control the allocation of 
:financial support than they did before. While bank entry into other 
securities activities, such as underwriting or private placements, 
might give banks greater control over the sources of capital, their 
performance of a clerical brokerage function will not. Because 
banks actually control a lower share of financial assets than they did 
thirty years ago, 133 and because antitrust laws already guard against 
undue concentration of power, 134 bank discount brokerage services 
will not injure the decentralization function of Glass-Steagall. In 
fact, to the extent that bank discount brokerage services attract new 
investors, financial decisionmaking will become more decentralized. 
Because the agency interpretation of section 24(7) does not share 
the interpretative burdens of accommodation theory, and because 
agency theory in the discount brokerage context does not implicate 
statutory concerns, the Glass-Steagall Act does not prohibit bank 
discount brokerage services. The legality of these services should not 
be surprising.135 Even the securities industry concedes that the Act 
129. See Evans, Regulation of Bank Securities Activities, 91 BANKING L.J. 611, 612 (1974); 
Karmel, supra note 28, at 633, 64041; Taylor, supra note 107, at 141-44. But see Smith, Inter-
state Banking Restrictions Outweigh Public Benefit, 101 TR. & EsT. 26, 28 (1982) (United States 
Attorney General co=enting that in banking, "[n]either market concentration nor aggregate 
concentration is a serious prospect."). 
130. See note 107 supra and accompanying text. 
131. Securities Indus. Assn., supra note 108, at 787. Concentration could permit "the large 
co=erical banks . . • to determine which enterprises are to grow and which are not, and 
investment decisions might tend to concentrate on a particular group of industries at expense 
of all others." Id. (footnotes omitted); see generally id. at 786-88; Taylor, supra note 107, at 
143. 
132. See text at notes 2-7 supra. 
133. See McKinsey, The General Store, circa 1983, Detroit Free Press, Mar. 21, 1983, at 
Cl, col. 2 (banks hold 37% of total financial assets today as opposed to 57% in 1946). 
134. See Smith, supra note 129, at 29; Note, Commercial Bank Private Placement Activity: 
Cracking Glass-Steagall, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 743, 763 (1978). 
135. In light of the extensive bank and securities regulation built up since the passage of 
Glass-Steagall, several bankers have argued that Glass-Steagall's concerns will rarely impli-
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allows banks to conduct some brokerage activities. 136 Congress pre-
sumably thought these activities compatible with commercial bank-
ing. Discount brokerage operations, if anything, should be more 
compatible with prudent banking than any other type of brokerage 
activity. By not offering any investment advice,137 these operations 
cate any bank securities activities. See, e.g., Angermueller, supra note 47, at 134, 138; 
Senerfitt, supra note 12, at 16, 20. 
136. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. 
137. This Note has assumed that banks providing discount brokerage services will not offer 
any investment advice. Most of the approved plans have not stated that services will include 
investment advice. See Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 106 (expressly states there will 
be no investment advice); Security Pacific Application, supra note 7, at 86,256 (investment ad-
vice not listed service) . .But see FHLBB General Counsel, supra note 104 (approving applica-
tions for stock brokerage and investment advisory services). The Federal Reserve Board's 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking also assumed that banks would not give investment advice. 
See Rulemaking Proposal supra note 10, at 7747. 
Nevertheless, even the additional service of investment advice might not tip the legal scales 
against bank discount brokerage services. First, the Supreme Court has always assumed that 
banks can offer such advice. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 624-25 
(1971). Moreover, the Court has held that banks can not only advise but can also manage 
closed-end investment funds. The Court stated that "[t)he management of a customer's invest-
ment portfolio - even when the manager has the power to sell the securities owned by the 
customer - is not the kind of selling activity that Congress contemplated when it enacted 
[§ 378)." Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System v. Investment Co. Inst. 450 U.S. 46, 
63 (1981). If Glass-Steagall does not forbid management discretion, it probably does not pro-
hibit investment advice coupled with agency services. 
Allowing banks to advise their discount brokerage customers does not violate Glass-Stea-
gall's policies. Provision of advice would not increase promotional pressures. Moreover, be-
cause banks have traditionally given advice, offering investment counseling along with 
discount brokerage would not cause an undue diversion of banking resources. 
Investment advice might, however, implicate the public confidence concern. If customers 
blame the bank's advice for losses suffered, if such losses outnumber gains, if the dissatisfac-
tion is great, and if customers transfer their dissatisfaction from the brokerage operation to the 
depository activities of a bank, then the solvency of individual banks might be threatened-
assuming, of course, that many depositors had invested in securities in the first place. This 
argument assumes that the bank's lack of expertise in securities advice would reflect on its 
overall management ability. Yet the Supreme Court has recognized the limited force of this 
domino-theory argument. Even where the bank was the organizer and manager of an open-
end investment fund, the Court stated: 
If the fund investment should tum out badly there would be a danger that the bank would 
lose the good will of those customers who had invested in the fund. It might be unlikely 
that disenchantment would go so far as to threaten the solvency of the bank. But because 
banks are dependent on the confidence of their customers, the risk would not be unreal. 
Camp, 401 U.S. at 638 (emphasis added). Where a bank only offers advice to individual cus-
tomers, but does not manage a fund, the threat to bank solvency seems even more "unlikely." 
A bank's offer of investment advice might also raise a conflict of interest problem, The 
Supreme Court has noted "the obligation of the co=erical banker to offer disinterested in-
vestment advice." Camp, 401 U.S. at 633. However, this concern is most acute where a bank 
acts as a principal. Where the bank gives advice and acts only as a broker, no conflict of 
interest arises. 
Two non-Glass-Steagall concerns may apply when a bank offers discount brokerage serv-
ices and investment advice. Neither of these concerns are unique to this area, however, and 
existing regulations can easily handle both. Banks might advise brokerage customers on the 
basis of inside information acquired through loan applications. However, similar opportuni-
ties already exist for favoring trust accounts, and the problem of inside information is hardly 
confined to banks. The securities laws and regulations provide the most appropriate means to 
control this problem. See generally, S. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 
148-53 (1977). A bank/broker might also have an opportunity to earn excessive commissions 
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eliminate Congress's promotional pressure and public confidence 
concerns. The nature of discount brokerage services also precludes 
development of a more modern Glass-Steagall problem, centraliza-
tion of banking functions. Thus, the agency activities inherent in 
bank discount brokerage services are permissible because they are 
consistent with the goals of the Glass-Steagall Act. 
Ill. THE REGULATION OF BANK DISCOUNT BROKERAGE 
OPERATIONS 
Although Glass-Steagall permits banks as well as bank holding 
companies138 to engage in discount brokerage, a further problem has 
if investment advice grew to provide actual control over a customer's account. See generally S. 
JAFFE, supra, at 306-25. This scenario is quite unlikely in the discount brokerage context, 
where structural pressures militate against giving advice; individual employees are unlikely to 
deal repeatedly with the same customer, and employees are not compensated on a per transac-
tion basis. See Shapiro, supra note 3, at 155 (Although Fidelty Brokerage "is giving bigger 
customers a more personal relationship with a specific registered rep . . . the rep offers no 
advice and receives no commission for this trouble."); see also note 3 supra. To the extent that 
the control problem does develop in discount brokerage, the anti-churning securities regula-
tions apply to brokers, see note 84 supra, and, if the suggestion of this Note is adopted, will 
apply to bank discount brokers as well. 
In short, bank discount brokers may well be able to offer investment advice without run-
ning into further legal problems. Though the arguments for this proposition do not favor legal-
ity as clearly as those for discount brokerage alone, they are still persuasive. 
138. This Note has focused on the corporate power of banks as delineated by the Glass-
Steagall Act. Bank holding companies, however, face another obstacle if they wish to offer 
discount brokerage services. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1976), a bank holding company that 
wishes to form or acquire a nonbanking subsidiary must apply to the Federal Reserve Board 
for permission. The Board must then determine if the proposed activity of the subsidiary "is 
so closely related to banking ... as to be a proper incident thereto." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) 
(1976). In making this determination, 
the Board shall consider whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding company can 
reasonably be ex~cted to produce benefits to the public, such as greater convenience, 
increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such 
as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of inter-
ests, or unsound banking practices. 
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976). 
The Board interprets its statutory mandate to require a two-step analysis. First, the Board 
determines whether the proposed activity is "closely related to banking." Next, it weighs 
public benefits against adverse effects to decide whether the activity is a proper incident to 
banking. See Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 106-07. The proposed activity must 
satisfy both these steps. See id.; CONFERENCE REP. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 5561, 5572-73. This analysis supports the conclusion that 
bank holding companies can legally offer discount brokerage services. See Federal Reserve 
Board, supra note 3. Because banks have the corporate power to perform discount brokerage 
services, the service is a banking activity, not just an activity "closely related to banking." 
Inasmuch as discount brokerage services constitute a banking activity per se, the inquiry ar-
guably need not reach the public benefits test, which should apply only to activities closely 
related to banking. In short, an activity perfectly legal for banks themselves should also be 
legal for bank holding companies. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(a)(l) (share purchase restrictions 
apply only to nonbank companies); 1843(c)(l)(c) (1976) (BHC may own a company engaged 
solely in furnishing services to or performing services for a BHC or its banking subsidiaries). 
If, however, the Board chooses to prove the question further, the more difficult obstacle for 
bank holding companies is the Board's inquiry into public benefits and adverse effects. The 
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troubled commentators. Both banks and the securities industry 
agree that those engaged in equivalent activities should be subject to 
equivalent regulation. 139 They disagree, however, on whether banks 
engaged in brokerage activities are regulated as strictly as nonbank 
brokers.140 The claim of unequal regulation arises because the se-
curitJes laws exempt banks from the definition of "broker."141 As a 
result, banks are not subject to the regulatory scheme promulgated 
and enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 142 
This exemption might lead both to inadequate protection for bank 
brokerage customers, 143 and to an unfair competitive advantage for 
public benefits include free competition, see, e.g., Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at I 09-
10; Clark & Saunders,supra note 16, at 818, more capital for modernization and expansion,see 
generally Angermueller, supra note 47; Senterfitt, supra note 12, and greater purchaser access 
to securities. See note 172 infra. Perhaps the best indication of the benefits, however, is the 
reaction of traditional securities firms. The industry fears that with banks entering the field, 
"discount brokers, a previously little-known and thinly capitalized segment of the [retail bro-
kerage] business, will gain marketing strength." Carrington, supra note I, at col. I. Dis-
counters have already forced "full-sevice brokers to quietly chop their fees to keep customers 
from defecting .... " Id. at col. 2. 
The securities industry, however, emphasizes the possible adverse effects of bank discount 
brokerage services. Basically, securities firms fear that discount brokerage will give banks an 
unfair competitive advantage that will result in overcentralization of financial resources. See 
Part II-D supra. However, these "adverse effects" do not implicate Glass-Steagall concerns, 
see Part II-D supra, and certainly do not outweigh the competitive benefits produced by bank 
discount brokerage operations. As a result, bank holding companies can perform these serv-
ices under 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1976). After a detailed analysis, the Federal Reserve Board 
reached the same conclusion. See Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3 .. 
139. See, e.g., Angermueller, supra note 47, at 137; Senterfitt, supra note 12, at 21-22; Se-
curities Indus. Assn., supra note 108, at 781; see also Securities Activities of Depository lnslilu• 
lions: Hearings on S.1720 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (statement of Donald T. Regan, Secre• 
tary of the Treasury) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Hearings]. 
140. Compare BankAIS,supra note 31, at 81,362-63 (Comptroller of the Currency arguing 
that "banks are subject to their own body of law and regulation, different but certainly no less 
strict than broker regulation"), with Evans, Regulation of Bank Securities Activities, 91 BANK· 
ING L.J. 611, 616-19 (1974) (then SEC Commissioner Evans); Securities Indus. Assn., supra 
note 108, at 781; Taylor, supra note 107, at 139-40 (1977). 
Securities spokespersons are not the only ones complaining about unfair regulatory bur-
dens, however. Bankers have observed that "we are still far more heavily regulated than our 
nonbanking competitors - such as full-line securities dealers . . . . The imbalance has its 
roots in the Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company Acts .... " See BANKAMERICA 
CoRP., 1981 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1982). Because Glass-Steagall only lists powers and prohibi-
tions, this complaint presumably involves the scope of permissible activities, rather than com-
pliance costs. 
141. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4) (1976) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934), § 80b-2(a)(3) 
(Investment Advisers Act of 1940); see also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l l) (1976) (banks and bank 
holding companies exempted from the definition of investment advisers). 
142. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78K, 780, 78q, (1976); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ccc(a)(z), 
78ddd(c) (1976) (membership of brokers in and assessment of fees for the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation). Banks acting as brokers are liable under the anti-fraud provisions, 
see note 79 supra. 
143. See Evans,supra note 129, at 614 (SEC Commissioner addressing the lack of investor 
protection); Securities Indus. Assn., supra note 108, at 790 ("Among the standards and safe-
guards ... inapplicable to banks and this unavailable to their brokerage customers, are those 
May 1983) Note - Bank Discount Brokerage Services 1529 
banks.144 
Although banks are now subject to a rigorous regulatory struc-
ture, 145 disparities in regulation do exist. Bank regulation aims to 
protect depositors and the stability of the banking system, 146 func-
tions served principally by the assurance of bank solvency.147 To 
avoid depositor runs on potentially troubled banks, the banking au-
thorities enforce the regulations in a spirit of familial secrecy.148 In 
contrast, the broker regulation protects investors by controlling busi-
relating to suitability, prompt execution, disclosure of adverse information, and insurance 
under the Securities Investor Protection Act."); Note, supra note 70, at 1497. 
144. See Securities Indus. Assn., supra note 108, at 777-79; Taylor, supra note 107, at 139-
40; see generally Evans, supra note 140. But see BANKAMERICA CORP., supra note 140 
(BankAmerica complaining of unfair regulatory burden on banks). 
145. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 161, 164, 481 (1976) (reports and examinations); 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 1813(1)(3), (m) (1976) (protection of customer funds); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1881-84 (1976) (require-
ments for security measures; penalties for noncompliance); Bank AIS, supra note 31, at 81,362-
63. 
The Comptroller and at least one commentator have argued that the regulatory coverage of 
banks and brokers is equivalent in the areas of record examination and protection of deposi-
tors from loss in case of insolvency. See Bank AIS, supra note 31, at 81,362-63; Note, supra 
note 70, at 1497-1500. The SEC has also concluded that banking regulation adequately pro-
tects against customer loss of securities through theft or insolvency. See Spencer, supra note 
106, at 624. 
Some securities law protections will also apply to bank brokerage customers. The anti-
fraud provisions will still apply to banks. See note 79 supra and accompanying text. More-
over, banks will presumably be subject to the same common law restrictions as brokers. See 
note 80 supra and accompanying text. And to the extent that disclosure by the issuer of the 
stock best protects investors, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m (1976); Evans, supra note 129, at 612-
13, 618, bank discount brokerage customers will receive the full benefit of this disclosure. 
146. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 129, at 617-18, Congress enacted Glass-Steagall in order 
to serve these goals. See A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 693 F.2d 136, 146-47 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act pri-
marily to protect bank depositors. . . . (It] aims at protecting the integrity of banks and the 
financial resources of depositors rather than investors.") (emphasis in original); notes 45-52 
supra and accompanying text. 
147. The bank examination statutes and regulations focus on the solvency of the bank. 
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 161(a) (1976) (report of resources and liabilities to the Comptroller), 12 
U.S.C. § 16l(c) (1976) (reports of affiliates must disclose the effect of the affiliate upon the 
affairs of the bank); 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a) (1976) (termination of bank's insured status if un-
sound practices or violations exist); 12 C.F.R. § 19.20 (1982) (temporary cease-and-desist order 
when bank practices are "likely to cause insolvency or substantial dissipation of assets or earn-
ings of the bank, or (are) likely to seriously weaken the condition of the bank or otherwise 
seriously prejudice the interests of its depositors"); see also Lybecker, supra note 71, at 978; 
Spencer, supra note 106, at 624. 
148. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 129, at 617-18 ("[b]ank requirements and standards are 
enforced in a 'discrete' way"); Securities Indus. Assn., supra note 108, at 790 (noting the ''un-
derstandable reluctance of [bank] regulators to unsettle the often delicate public confidence 
upon which the banking system depends"); Schoenbaum, Bank Securities Activities and the 
Need to Separate Trust Departments from Large Commerical Banks, 10 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 1, 
13-14 (1976) (bank regulators distrust disclosure). Schoenbaum goes further than others, 
claiming a" 'race oflaxity' between (fie] the different [bank] regulatory agencies." Id. at 1-2. 
Congress has also recognized the need for confidential enforcment of the banking laws. The 
Freedom of Information Act does not apply to "examination, operating or condition reports 
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervi-
sion of financial institutions." 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(8) (1976), 
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ness practices.149 To deter unethical practices , the SEC enforces the 
law in a public and adversarial manner. 1so Although not dispositive, 
the contrast in goals and approaches suggests that the bank regula-
tory structure provides less protection to securities investors. 
In several areas, this difference between philosophies is matched 
by differences in regulatory impact and coverage. The first discrep-
ancy is in the required training of securities personnel. The SEC 
enforces extensive requirements with respect to the training, compe-
tency, and supervision of employees. 1st One firm estimated that in 
1981 it spent over one million dollars in training and examination 
costs.152 When the SEC pointed out this discrepancy in a 1977 
study, bank regulators "specifically declined to adopt any such re-
quirements, maintaining that general bank examination procedures 
are adequate."153 Existing bank regulations are probably sufficient if 
149. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198 (1976) ("(T)he overall Congres-
sional purpose in the 1933 and 1934 Acts [was] to protect investors against false and deceptive 
practices that might injure them") (citation omitted); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & 
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1971); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964); see also 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 51 U.S.L.W. 4099, 4103 (1983) ("Defrauded investors are 
among the very individuals Congress sought to protect in the securities laws."). In contrasting 
this emphasis to bank regulation, one co=entator noted: "[O]ne continuing disparity that 
only Congress can remedy is to place on bank regulatory agencies investor protection man-
dates in addition to their responsibilities to bank depositors." Karmel, supra note 28, at 635; 
see also 1982 Hearings, supra note 139, at 35 (statement of John S.R. Shad, SEC Chairman) 
("The missions and the regulatory philosophies of the banking authorities and the SEC are 
different."). 
150. See Evans, supra note 129, at 618 (when the SEC discovers a violation, it "takes en-
forcement action which is disclosed to the public"); see also Angermueller, supra note 47, at 
133 ("The co=erical banks' regulatory environment has been more supportive and less hos-
tile than the scrutiny and rules under which investment banks operate."); Note, supra note 70, 
at 1499 (bank "enforcment proceedings are not as well publicized as those of the SEC, which 
announces disciplinary actions relating even to minor infractions"); 1982 Hearings,supra note 
139, at 35 (statement of John S.R. Shad, SEC Chairman). 
151. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(7) (1976) (standar95 of competence for registered brokers 
and dealers); 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(2) (1976) (registered securities associations must comply 
with these rules); 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)(l) (1976) (self-regulatory organizations must comply with 
rules); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b8-l (1982) (qualifications for brokers not members of a national 
securities association); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15bl0-4 (1982) (diligent supervision of employees re-
quired); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19g2-l (1982) (enforcing compliance by national securities exchanges 
and registered securities associations). 
152. 1982 Hearings, supra note 139, at 156 (statement of Sam Scott Miller): 
Training of salesmen is another area of regulatory disparity. As I previously noted, all 
Paine Webber employees involved in the marketing and sale of securities, including our 
money market fund, must pass rigorous NASD and stock exchange examinations as a 
prerequisite to registration. Most of Paine Webber's salesmen are graduates of our own 
training school. A principal purpose of the school is to provide trainees the information 
they need to pass the examination. Paine Webber spent well over $1,000,000 last year to 
maintain this training facility and to administer broker examinations. There are no spe• 
cific training or examination requirements for bank personnel who currently engage in 
securities or trust department activities. 
153. 1982 Hearings, supra note 139, at 32 (statement of John S.R. Shad, SEC Chairman). 
The SEC study found disparities between bank and brokerage regulation in the areas of 
record-keeping, personnel competency, and confirmation requirements. See Spencer, supra 
note 106, at 625. Bank regulations adopted in 1979, however, now cover record keeping and 
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a bank's discount brokerage business primarily involves simple cleri-
cal services.154 If, on the other hand, the discount brokerage opera-
tion offers investment advice, 155 then traditional firms offering 
similar services will face a competitively disadvantageous training 
requirement, while investors using the bank's services may receive 
less reliable advice. 
The second difference between banks and securities firms con-
cerns regulatory constraints on advertising. The stock exchanges, 
under the supervision of the SEC, restrict broker advertising that is 
unfair or misleading. 156 Banks are not subject to similar regula-
tions.157 Although bank examiners do review advertising "to deter-
mine whether it contains any violations of the banking laws (for 
example, payment of excessive interest rates), examiners are not gen-
erally charged with looking for unfair or misleading advertising re-
lating to the performance of brokerage services." 158 Even if they 
were so charged, examiners untrained in securities law could not ef-
fectively scrutinize similarly untrained bank personnel.159 
A final concern is the clear disparity in margin loan regulation of 
confirmation requirements for bank securities transaction. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 12.1-12.7 (1982) 
(national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 208.8(k) (1982) (state banks that are members of the Federal 
Reserve System). Chairman Shad remains unimpressed: "[T]hese rules tend to be considera-
bly less specific than those of the SEC, in many cases relying on reference to 'sound banking 
practices' rather than the more specific regulations applicable to securities firms." 1982 Hear-
ings, supra note 139, at 32. 
154. See notes 1-7 supra and accompanying text. The SEC regulations apply to broker-
dealers, who are salesmen and offer investment advice. As far as investor protection is con-
cerned, bank employees will not need equally extensive training to perform comparatively 
simple clerical tasks. In addition, bank record keeping requirements should protect investors 
from incompetent clerks. See note 153 supra. By the same token, unfairness objections do not 
apply here, because different functions justify different regulation: banks offering clerical dis-
count brokerage services do not need to train their employees as thoroughly as sales-oriented 
securities firms. 
155. See notes 7, 137 supra. 
156. See AMER. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) ,i,i 9490 (Apr. 3, 1962); 9491A (Feb. 4, 1977); 
9496-99 (April 3, 1962); 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) iJiJ 2472, 2474A, 2474B (Feb. 2, 1977). 
157. 1982 Hearings, supra note 139, at 32 (statement of John S.R. Shad, SEC Chairman). 
The only regulations on bank securities advertising do not encompass bank brokerage services. 
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 9.18(b)(5) (1982) (advertising of common trust funds); 225.125(h) (advi-
sory services for investment companies) (1982). 
158. 1982 Hearings, supra note 139, at 32 (statement of John S.R. Shad, SEC Chairman). 
159. The stock exchange rules generally are prophylactic; advertising material must be 
approved in advance by trained employees. See, e.g., 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) iJ 2472 (Rule 
472) (1978). 
Bank examinations, in contrast, are after-the-fact. Examiners might discover unfair advertis-
ing but could not prevent its damage already done. 
Additionally, although bank brokerage services are subject to anti-fraud provisions, see 
text at note 79 supra, a range of harmful conduct falls short of the requisite showing of mate-
rial misrepresentation. In contrast, stock exchanges are "concerned with the manner - or 
form - in which information and opinions are presented." Id., at ,i 2474A.10. Testimonials, 
for example, cannot "be indicative of future performance or success," and they must disclose 
whether any sums were paid for the testimonial. Id. at ,i 2474A.10(4). 
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bank and nonbank brokers. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934160 
authorizes margin regulations for banks and brokers under different 
subsections.161 This difference in statutory authority has two conse-
quences. First, banks are subject to margin restrictions on loans for 
the purchase of stock, but not on loans for the purchase of nonequity 
securities. 162 Second, the discrepancy in authority permits different 
margin restrictions between banks and brokers even for stock 
purchase -loans.163 Though the stock loan restrictions are currently 
equivalent, 164 bank discount brokers are still governed by a less de-
tailed set of regulations than other discount brokers. 165 , 
Unfortunately, this difference in regulation of margin loans is not 
justified when banks act as discount brokers. Congress apparently 
assumed that banks would process margin loans no differently than 
other loans, and that they would require an extensive application 
and credit check before advancing any margin credit.166 In contrast, 
160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976). 
161. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g(a), (c), (d) (1976). 
162. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d)(D) (1976) (authority to regulate bank margin loans does 
not apply to any "security other than an equity security") with 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c)(I) (1976) 
(authority to regulate brokerage margin loans made for the purchase or maintenance of "any 
security"). See generally 12 C.F.R. §§ 220, 221 (1982) (different regulations for loans by bro-
kers and loans by banks); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934), reprinted In 5 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 
1934, at item 18 (1973) (compiled by J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR) (hereinafter cited as 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] ("Banks are subject to margin limitations only on loans on registered 
equity securities in cases where the loan is sought for the purpose of purchasing or carrying 
securities."); note 68 supra. One could argue that this exemption for nonequity (debt) securi-
ties recognizes the banks' traditional role of "discounting and negotiating promissory notes, 
drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt." 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1976). Because this 
function is central to banking, securities regulation arguably should not control it. The distinc-
tion between "purpose" loans, which are made for the purpose of purchasing stock, and non-
purpose loans especially reflects regulatory recognition of this difference in occupation. See 12 
C.F.R. § 221 (1982) (Reg U may impose margin limit on broker but not on banks when loan is 
secured with stocks); see generally 2 L. Loss, supra note 7, at 1261-62. However, this observa-
tion does more to explain the origin of the debt securities exemption than it does to justify 
extension of that exemption to high volume, discount brokerage services. 
163. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g(a), (c), (d) (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 162, at item 18 (''The (Federal Reserve] Board 
is not required to fix the same margins for banks as for brokers .... "). 
164. See note 68 supra and accompanying text. 
165. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 220, 221 (1982); note 68 supra. Some of the differences in margin 
regulations might exist because banks are in the business of making loans, whereas brokers are 
not. See notes 68, 162 supra. 
166. See, e.g., Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on R.R. 7852 and R.R. 8720 Before the 
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 7~d Cong., 2d Sess. 52-53 (hereinafter 
cited as Stock Exchange Regulation Hearings] (statement ofWoodliefThomas) ("(B]anks are a 
little more particular about whom they make loans to than a brokerage house. A bank will 
ordinarily make some credit investigation and find out about the credit standing of the individ-
ual."); id. at 274 (statement ofW.D. Gradison, President, Cincinnati Stock Exchange) ("Banks 
also recognw: the moral and financial character of the borrower in determining collateral 
values; thus a person of good moral character and high purpose can usually borrow more on 
his securities than a speculator or one whose record does not entitle him to credit."); Id. at 687 
(statement of Thomas Garner Corcoran, one of the drafters of the bill) ("(Blanks ..• require a 
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Congress expected brokers to process margin loans routinely, with 
approval based primarily on the collateral value of the underlying 
securities.167 Where banks act as brokers, a role the 1934 Congress 
misunderstood, 168 this assumption about bank margin loans is not 
necessarily true, and it is even less likely to be true where banks act 
as discount brokers. Both bank and nonbank discount brokers rely 
on the speed and volume of transactions to make a profit. 169 Neither 
fosters extensive client-brokerage relationships. 170 Both seem likely 
to lend on the basis of the collateral value alone. 
When banks act as discount brokers, then, the difference in regu-
latory coverage is not justified by Cop.gress's original purpose and is 
inherently unfair to nonbank discount brokers.171 To the extent that 
more extensive securities regulations help protect investors,172 bank 
borrower to make an adequate proof of credit standing to get a loan on securities."). Mr. 
Corcoran stated this in partial explanation of why banks were excluded from the definition of 
"broker" in the revised bill. Id at 687-88; see also id. at 627 (§ 3(a)(7) of the revised bill 
excludes bank from the definition of broker). The original bill did not exclude banks. See id. 
at 2 (the original bill's definition of "broker" was "any person engaged in a business of effect-
ing transactions in securities for the account of others"). 
167. See id. at 52 (statement ofWoodliefThomas) ("[I]t has been relatively simple to open 
up an account with a broker .•.• " The borrower did not need a credit reference or evidence 
of his ability to meet future obligations.); id. at 67 (statement of E.A. Goldenweiser, Director 
of Research and Statistics, Federal Reserve Board) ("Anyone can borrow money from brokers 
for the purpose of carrying stocks ••.. "); id. at 688 (statement of Thomas Garner Corcoran) 
("[B]rokers .•. almost push credit down the customer's throat to give themselves bigger turn-
over and commissions."). • 
168. Though the legislative history of Glass-Steagall explicitly allowed some role for bank 
brokerage activities, see note 49 supra, at least one witness in the 1934 securities hearings 
testified that under Glass-Steagall banks would no longer be able to "go in the business, like a 
broker, of dealing in securities." Stock Exchange Regulation Hearings, supra note 166, at 86 
(statement of Thomas Garner Corcoran); see also Securities Indus. Assn., supra note 108, at 
790. Because this witness apparently knew of the accommodation theory, and because other 
witnesses testified that banks could act as agents, see, e.g., Stock Exchange Regulation Hear-
ings, supra note 166, at 154 (statement of Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock 
Exchange) ("[Blanks •.. customarily act as agent for their customers in buying and selling 
securities • • . ."), the role that Congress thought banks would play in the securities industry is 
unclear. 
169. See notes 7, 63 & 65 supra and accompanying text. 
170. See notes 2-4 & 7 supra and accompanying text. BankAmerica's discount brokerage 
operation, for example, relies on automation and low prices rather than on cultivated client 
relationships. See Federal Reserve Board, supra note 3, at 106, 109. 
171. Witnesses in the 1982 Hearings repeatedly stressed the unfairness of competitors oper-
ating under different regulatory regimes. See, e.g., 1982 Hearings, supra note 139, at 4 (state-
ment of Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury); id. at 87 (statement of Professor Robert 
Charles Clark). 
172. In enacting the section on margin loan restrictions, for example, Congress had three 
goals in mind. Of most ·relevance here, Congress wanted to protect inexperienced investors 
from excessive margin purchases. See, e.g., Stock Exchange Regulation Hearings, supra note 
166, at 67 (statement ofE.A. Goldenweiser) ("[M]any of the people who are buying stocks on 
margin are not even aware . . . that they are at the same time borrowing money . . • ."); id. at 
72-73 (statement of E.A. Goldenweiser); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 11 (1934), re-
printed in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 162, at item 21 (the margin "provisions are 
intended to protect the margin purchaser by making it impossible for him to buy securities on 
too thin a margin"); s. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLA-
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brokerage customers do not receive this protection. And the original 
rationale for the discrepancy, the difference in bank and broker busi-
ness practices, no longer applies to discount brokerage. 
To remedy the disparity in regulation and to adhere to the legis-
lative rationale, the banking authorities should impose a prudential 
precondition:173 every bank wishing to engage in discount brokerage 
must incorporate the service separately from the bank. This require-
ment would eliminate regulatory disparity because the relevant stat-
utory exemptions cover only banks as such. 174 Holding company 
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 162, at item 17 (easy margin lending practices "encourage the 
purchase of securities by persons with insufficient resources to protect their accounts in the 
event ofa decline"); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEOISLA· 
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 162, at item 18 ("protection of the small investor by making it im-
possible to spread himself too thinly . . . will be achieved as a byproduct of the main 
purpose"). 
Protection of na"iVe investors is more important with discount brokerage services than with 
other securities activities. Bankers, in extolling the advantages of bank-affiliated discounted 
brokers, stress that these services will increase small investor participation in the capital mar-
kets. See, e.g., Angermueller, supra note 47, at 135 (banks can tap the reservoir of "household 
capital" because they have 44,000 offices, compared to 3600 retail offices for securities firms); 
Clark & Saunders, supra note 16, at 818. Presumably these small investors are those most in 
need of protection from commission-hungry brokers. 
Congress also restricted margin lending in order to prevent diversion of credit resources 
into stock market speculation, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b(3)(a), 78g(a), (b), (d) (1976); H.R. REP, 
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 8 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 7 (1934), and 
to prevent undue stock market fluctuations. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 7, at 1242-43. Where 
banks freely lend money on the basis of collateral value alone, these purposes are also frus-
trated. If the price of a stock declines sharply, for example, the collateral value declines 
sharply. The bank might feel compelled to call the loan; this would in tum force the investor 
(and others in the same position) to sell stock, further depressing its price. 
This is not to say that every provision of the securities regulations protects investors. In 
fact, some of those complaining about unfair advantage of banks also complain about the 
absurdity of some of the securities regulations. See, e.g., 1982 Hearings, supra note 139, at 
156-57 (statement of Sam Scott Miller). 
173. Regulators have often imposed conditions on banks entering certain fields. See, e.g., 
Rulemaking Proposal,supra note 10, at 7746-47 (banks operating as discount brokers would act 
solely as agents, without any underwriting activities or provision of investment advice, and 
margin lending by nonbank subsidiaries would be conducted pursuant to Regulation T); 12 
C.F.R. § 225.4 (Regulation Y) (listing of activities, and restrictions on those activities, that 
bank holding companies can engage in without special permission); Security Pac!fic Applica-
tion, supra note 7, at 86,259-61 (bank forming discount brokerage subsidiary must process all 
margin loans at bank branch offices). The Supreme Court has relied extensively on these 
preconditions in evaluating the legality of particular activities. See Board of Governors of 
Federal Reserve System v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 52, 56-57, 62, 67 (1981). 
174. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 simply excludes a bank from the definition of 
"broker'' and then defines "bank" narrowly. "Broker'' "means any person engaged in the busi-
ness of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a 
bank." 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(4) (1976). "Bank" is defined as: 
(A) a banking institution organized under the laws of the United States, (B) a member 
bank of the Federal Reserve System, (C) any other banking institution, whether incorpo-
rated or not, doing business under the laws of any State of the United States, a substantial 
portion of the business of which consists of receiving deposits or exercising fiduciary pow-
ers similar to those permitted to national banks under section I l(k) of the Federal Reserve 
Act, as amended, and which is supervised and examined by State or Federal authority 
having supervision over banks, and which is not operated for the purpose of evading the 
provisions of this chapter, and (D) a receiver, conservator, or other liquidating agent of 
any institution or firm included in clauses (A), (B), or (C) of this paragraph. 
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affiliates and bank subsidiaries are within the definition of broker, 175 
and thus would be required to register with the SEC.176 
Separately incorporated, discount brokerage operations would be 
subject to normal SEC regulation and would follow the broker mar-
gin rules. Nor is separate incorporation overly burdensome to 
banks. Every reported bank discount brokerage proposal has stated 
that the brokerage will be separately incorporated.177 For reasons of 
increased fairness and low-cost investor protection, both the Treas-
ury Department and the SEC have advocated mandatory separate 
incorporation for other bank securities activities. 178 
The Treasury and SEC proposal, however, differs in several ma-
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6) (1976). A discount brokerage subsidiary or affililate is not a national 
bank (subsection A), see generally 12 U.S.C. § 161 (1976), nor a member of the Federal Re-
serve System (subsection B), see generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 222, 321 (1976), nor a recipient of 
deposits or holder of fiduciary powers (subsection C). See generally notes 2-7 supra and ac-
companying text. 
175. Because they are not within the definition of "bank," see note I74supra, they are not 
excluded from the definition of broker. 
176. The SEC at one point contemplated deleting the entire bank exemption from the 
definition of broker. See Spencer, supra note 106, at 626. It did not recommend this action 
however, because it ''would result in duplicative and unduly burdensome regulation in some 
respects." Id. The SEC noted that for the most part, recent bank incursions into securities, 
while "highly visible, were only formalizations of activities conducted by banks over the 
years." Id at 616. The SEC found, for example, that over 4,000 banks perform some type of 
customer brokerage service, a number that has remained fairly constant in recent years. Id. at 
619. 
The registration requirement, however, would not apply to those banks engaging in occa-
sional securities transactions. It would only apply to banks that set up a high-volume discount 
brokerage service. Furthermore, the SEC apparently never considered the routine extension of 
margin credit in the context of bank discount brokerage operations. See id. at 617 n.4 (descrip-
tion of bank brokerage activities studied). In an Automatic Investment Service, for example, 
the bank extends no credit whatsoever, but executes the transaction after deducting the appro-
priate amount from the customer's checking account. See id.; Bank AIS, supra note 31, at 
81,354. Similarly, the employee stock purchase plans and the dividend reinvestment plans 
studied by the Commission involved automatic deductions rather than extension of credit. See 
Spencer, supra note 106, at 617 n.4. See generally Note, supra note 70, at 1478-80 (description 
of bank brokerage activities in the mid-seventies). Even in his 1982 testimony SEC Chairman 
Shad only discussed brokerage activities that did not involve margin lending. See 1982 Hear-
ings, supra note 139, at 31-32 (statement of John S.R. Shad, SEC Chairman). The First regu-
latory approval of bank discount brokerage operations did not occur until later in the year. 
See S & L Brokerage Proposal, supra note 11. 
177. See BankAmerica Application, supra note 2, at 85,961 (bank holding company affili-
ate); FHLBB General Counsel, supra note 104, at 61,031-32 (several proposals for securities 
subsidiary, joint ventures with discount brokerage firms, and investments in discount broker-
age firms); Security Pacific Application, supra note 7, at 86,255 (bank subsidiary); S & L Broker-
age Proposal, supra note 8, at 61,022 (corporation owned by several savings and loan 
associations). All of the brokerage corporations are registered as brokers with the SEC. See, 
e.g., Federal Reserve Board,supra note 3, at 106 (BankAmerica's operation); FHLBB General 
Counsel, supra note 104, at 61,030 n.3. 
178. See 1982 Hearings, supra note 139, at 6, 9, 11, 17 (statement of Donald T. Regan, 
Secretary of the Treasury) (needed to preserve competitive equality and upgrade investor pro-
tection); id at 25 (statement of John S. R. Shad, SEC Chairman). The proposal did not address 
discount brokerage subsidiaries but was limited to banks that wanted to underwrite municipal 
revenue bonds or act as advisors to mutual funds. Id. at 5, 6. 
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terial respects from the recommendation of this Note. First, it would 
limit the power of banking regulators to oversee the operations of 
securities affiliates.179 Presumably the rationale of this approach is 
to prevent duplicative, burdensome regulation. 180 But this concern 
seems unjustified given that all bank discount brokerage operations 
have so far willingly submitted to the overlapping jurisdiction of the 
SEC and the bank agencies. 181 Because banking authorities often 
need to examine affiliates closely to protect bank depositors, 182 and 
because bank examiners can exercise their authority with some flex-
ibility, 183 prudence requires that the normal bank regulations on af-
filiates should remain intact. 
179. See 1982 Hearings,supra note 139, at 5-6 (statement of Donald T. Regan, Secretary of 
the Treasury); id. at 53 (statement of J. Charles Partee, Member, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System). According to Mr. Partee, the proposal would permit the Federal 
Reserve to examine the affiliates only on "a prior finding that the financial condition of the 
affiliate is likely to have a materially adverse effect on the safety and soundness of the bank." 
Id. at 55. In short, the Board could only examine a subsidiary for soundness where the un-
soundness of the subsidiary is apparent. This measure is less likely to prevent financial deteri-
oration than it is to arrest it. 
180. SEC Chairman Shad puts great stress on regulation by function - "the principle that 
similar functions should be regulated by the same agency." 1982 Hearings, supra note 139, at 
32. He sees three advantages to this approach. First, each agency regulates where it has the 
most expertise. Second, each "function" is regulated consistently. Third, functional regulation 
"minimizes regulatory conflict, duplication, and overlap." Id. at 35. These three virtues are 
not necessarily consistent. Only the third, for example, mandates a complete and rigid division 
of regulatory jurisdiction. The first principle - dividing jurisdiction by expertise - might in 
fact mandate regulatory overlap. The SEC, for example, has developed an expertise in the 
regulation of brokerage operations. However, it has no expertise in evaluating how the activi-
ties of an affiliate can impair depositor confidence in a bank. See note 182 infra and accompa-
nying text. Only the banking authorities have developed this proficiency. Thus, if expertise 
were the sole criterion for allocating regulatory jurisdiction, both the SEC and the banking 
authorities would regulate brokerage affiliates of banks. 
181. All have registered with the SEC as brokers, see note 177 supra, but they are still 
subject to bank regulation. 
182. The Federal Reserve Board objected strongly to limiting its oversight of affiliates be-
cause of the need to protect depositors. See 1982 Hearings, supra note 139, at 43 (statment of J. 
Charles Partee, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (Board would 
not object to separate incorporation "if we were to retain the authority to go in and to look at 
those activities and see the extent to which they are affecting the status of the whole banking 
organization."). 
The Board is worried about the effect of a struggling affiliate on the public's perception of 
the bank. Id. at 43, 53-55, 57, 60-62, 65-66. Normally, ''the public's confidence in a bank is 
generally linked with the financial strength of any important nonbank affiliate." Id. at 55. 
Because "the public often is aware that the bank and its nonbank affiliates are under common 
management and control, and are operated largely as a single entity . . . the public is apt to 
assume that when an important nonbank affiliate is experiencing financial difficulty, the bank 
may also be having problems .... " Id. a~ 68. In the past decade, adverse public reaction to 
problems of affiliates has driven two banks out of business. Id. at 65-66. Thus, to protect 
depositors fully, bank regulators need the authority to examine affiliates. 
183. See 12 U.S.C. § 486 (1976) (Comptroller or Board can waive reports from affiliate if 
reports are unnecessary); 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (1976) (Board can use reports of other bank 
agencies instead of requiring its own). The Board has stated it would use any SEC-generated 
information in the oversight of bank securities affiliates. See 1982 Hearings, supra note 139, at 
55 (statement of J. Charles Partee, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem). Such cooperation could ease any burden caused by overlapping jurisdiction. 
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Second, the Treasury and SEC proposal requires that the sepa-
rate securities corporation be a bank holding company affiliate184 
rather than a direct bank subsidiary. By imposing this corporate 
structure, banking operations could be further insulated from any 
risk incident to the securities activity. 185 With discount brokerage, 
however, risk is not really an issue186 because relatively little capital 
investment is involved.187 To the extent that discount brokerage 
poses a danger to the parent bank, the normal bank examination 
procedure, with its emphasis on solvency and protection of deposi-
tors, responds to the problem more directly. 188 The other restrictions 
set forth in the Treasury and SEC proposal are similarly irrelevant to 
discount brokerage.1s9 
184. See 1982 Hearings,supra note 139, at 5-6 (statment of Donald T. Regan, Secretary of 
the Treasury). As a concession to small banks made because of the costs of reorganizing into a 
bank holding company, banks with less than $100 million in assets would be able to set up 
direct securities subsidiaries. Id at 6. 
Though this Note would not require a bank holding company structure, banks wishing to 
operate a discount brokerage might find such a structure desirable. If the Comptroller's appli-
cation of the McFadden Act to discount brokerage is correct, see note 190 i,y'ra, direct broker-
age subsidiaries are subject to fairly stringent margin lending restrictions. 
185. See 1982 Hearings,supra note 139, at 17 (statement of Donald T. Regan, Secretary of 
the Treasury); id. at 97-98 (statement of Professor Robert Charles Clark). The logic appar-
ently is that losses of a subsidiary directly injure the parent bank; losses of a bank holding 
company affiliate directly injure the parent holding company but only indirectly reflect upon 
the bank affiliate. Public reaction to losses of an affiliate, however, does not seem to depend on 
the intricacies of corporate form. The public considers problems of an affiliate as problems of 
the bank. See note l82supra. Thus, the threat ofa panic by depositors does not seem to vary 
with the corporate form. 
186. The rationale for separate incorporation for discount brokerage services is not insula-
tion from risk, but equivalence of regulation and protection of bank brokerage clients. See 
note 178 supra and accompanying text. 
187. See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text. 
188. In its desire to eliminate overlapping regulation, the Treasury proposal limited the 
most important guard against risks to the bank - bank agency oversight of nonbank affiliates. 
See notes 179-83 supra and accompanying text. If allocation of regulatory jurisdiction by 
expertise is the goal, the banking authorities certainly have the most expertise in protecting 
bank depositors from the risks of nonbank affiliates. See note 180 supra. 
189. The Treasury and SEC proposal imposed two other requirements on bank securities 
subsidiaries. First, relations between the bank and the subsidiary would be tightly regulated. 
Banks, for example, could not offer interest-free or low-interest loans to the subsidiary. These 
regulations would prevent certain bank advantages, such as access to low-cost funds, from 
spilling over and subsidizing nonbank activities. See 1982 Hearings, supra note 139, at 6, 8 
(statement of Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury). 
These bank "subsidies" might affect competition for government revenue bonds and mu-
tual funds - the bank securities activities discussed during the hearings-but such subsidies 
are unlikely to affect competition in the discount brokerage industry. This position is, in effect, 
the "cross-subsidization" argument already rejected by the Federal Reserve Board. See notes 
122-26 supra and accompanying text. Low barriers to entry, actual entry by relatively small 
firms, and the present 91.6% market share of full-service brokers, see note 123 supra and ac-
companying text, make it unlikely that bank subsidization of affiliates would cause a few bank 
affiliates to dominate discount brokerage in particular or retail brokerage in general. 
The second restriction in the proposal was that if banks engaged in the new activities -
underwriting government revenue bonds and advising mutual funds - they not only must 
incorporate these activities separately, but must also transfer their other securities activities to 
the new entity. See 1982 Hearings, supra note 139, at 5-6 (statement of Donald T. Regan, 
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The Federal Reserve Board has expressed two reservations about 
a separate incorporation requirement, and its proposed rule on bank 
holding company discount brokerage operations does not contain 
such a provision.19° First, the Board proposed to retain supervisory 
power over brokerage affiliates;191 as discussed above, this Note's 
proposal would not limit this power. Second, the Board felt that sep-
arate incorporation might burden smaller banks. 192 Yet of the small 
institutions proposing discount brokerage services, chiefly savings 
and loan associations, every one stated that the service would be sep-
arately incorporated. 193 The reason for this approach is simple: dis-
count brokerage requires a large customer base. 194 These 
institutions, too small to run such an extensive operation themselves, 
Secretary of the Treasury). Because discount brokerage is a discrete clerical-type activity, 
without either the risk or judgment required of other bank securities involvement, this step is 
unnecessary. To the extent discount brokers try to pare costs by eliminating all other func-
tions, see text at notes 2-7 supra, regulations should not burden bank discount brokerage serv-
ices with other securities activities. 
190. See Rulemaking Proposal, supra note 10, at 7747. The only requirement for separate 
incorporation is that any margin lending done pursuant to Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. Part 220 
(1982) (margin credit regulations for brokers), must be "conducted by nonbank subsidiaries of 
bank holding companies .... " Id. The proposal did not clearly indicate whether banks 
could continue directly to offer margin credit under Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. Part 221 (1982). 
The Comptroller has taken the opposite approach to margin credit. He ruled that "all 
essential branch banking functions performed in connection with (the discount brokerage op-
erations] be performed at chartered (authorized branch] offices." Security Pacflic Application, 
supra note 7, at 86,261. The Comptroller considered the extension of margin credit, even by a 
separately incorporated discount brokerage service, as a branch function for the purposes of 
the McFadden Act. Jd.;see 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1976) (regulation of branch banking activities). 
Nonbranch discount brokerage offices could advise clients on loans, but all loan applications 
would need to be processed and approved at regular bank branch offices. Security Pacflic 
Application, supra note 7, at 86,259-60. This is a restrictive interpretation where the brokerage 
subsidiary is registered with the SEC as a broker, id. at 86,256, and so should have the freedom 
to extend margin loans as a broker. 
While both these restrictions reflect, in opposite directions, the congressional assumptions 
about margin loans, see notes 166-67 supra and accompanying text, neither responds to the 
problems of unequal regulation and unequal investor protection. See text at notes 151-65, 172 
supra. This Note's recommendation of mandatory separate incorporation with concommitant 
SEC registration is a more comprehensive approach to meshing the separate systems of regula-
tion. To the extent that bank agency proposals ignore such concerns as investor protection, 
they fail to fulfill Congress's plan to protect brokerage customers. 
191. See note 182supra. 
192. See 1982 Hearings, supra note 139, at 45, 52-55, 64 (statement of J. Charles Partee, 
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
193. FHLBB General Counsel, supra note 104; S & L Brokerage Proposal, supra note 8. 
194. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. In contrast, activities allowed under the 
Treasury proposal did not require extensive resources. The Treasury Department would have 
allowed banks to underwrite government revenue bonds and advise mutual fund companies. 
See note 178 supra. Smaller banks might only bid on a few bonds in a year; separate incorpor-
ation and capitalization might drive them out of the municipal bond business. See 1982 Hear-
ings, supra note 139, at 45, 52, 64 (statement of J. Charles Partee, Member, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System). The Treasury and SEC requirement would thus 
be unfair to these banks, and would actually reduce competition among municipal bond 
underwriters. 
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band together in joint ventures or servicing arrangements. 195 They 
can only operate a discount brokerage through a pooling of re-
sources that necessarily requires separate entity status. The Board's 
solicitude for small banks is misplaced here. Given the advantages 
of separate incorporation, and the lack of serious drawbacks, bank 
regulators should require it of all bank discount brokerage 
operations. 
CONCLUSION 
Two interpretations can reconcile the apparent conflict among 
the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act. The agency interpretation, 
which permits bank discount brokerage services, has the advantages 
of Supreme Court precedent and internal consistency. Further ex-
amination of the purposes of Glass-Steagall indicates that discount 
brokerage is not within the proscribed category of investment bank-
ing. The arguments against discount brokerage fall away upon rec-
ognition of the nature of the business. It is a service business lacking 
the speculative direct investment element characteristic of dealing or 
underwriting. The implementation of discount brokerage services, 
however, raises several problems of fairness and protection of inves-
tors. To remedy these problems, the regulatory authorities should 
require separate incorporation of the discount brokerage operation. 
195. In the most recent batch of proposals, for example, only three contemplated opera-
tions wholly owned by small institutions. Three others involved an equity investment in a 
newly formed discount brokerage firm, a joint venture with an existing discount brokerage 
firm, and a service arrangement with a newly formed brokerage firm. See FHLBB General 
Counsel, supra note 104, at 61,031-32. 
